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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background of Globalization and FDI in Asia 
In terms of globalization, it is remarkable that many multinational corporations 
(MNCs) are investing abroad today. With globalization the world is melting 
into one global economy and many firms are moving through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) within this market. According to Hymer (1976) there are two 
motivating factors of FDI: (1) Many firms are struggling with a lot of 
competitors not only in their home markets but also abroad. Therefore they 
attempt to reduce international competition through FDI. (2) MNCs strive for 
increasing their profits from the utilization of their special advantages. 
Dunning (1993) is explaining FDI with the location factor abroad (cheap labor, 
capital).  
Figure 1-1 FDI Inflow by Country 2009-2010 
(in Billions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
(Source: World Investment Report, 2011:29; Table Annex I.1) 
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In Figure 1-1 the FDI inflow of selected countries is presented from 2009 until 
2010. The United States represented the world’s largest recipient of FDI in 
2010 with 228 billion USD among the industrialized countries. China was 
ranked in second place followed by Hong Kong (China) with 69 billion USD. 
With a 39 billion USD FDI inflow in 2010, Singapore reached the FDI inflow 
level of Germany in 2009.  Figure 1-2 shows the FDI stock of selected 
countries from 1990 to 2010. The FDI stock of Singapore in 2010 was only 
470 billion USD, yet it showed a 15-fold increase from 1990–2010. On the 
other side, the USA held the highest FDI stock with 3,45 trillion USD in 2010, 
however, this was only a sextuple increase from 540 billion USD from 1990-
2010. 
 
Figure 1-2 FDI Stock by Economy 1990-2010  
(in Millions of dollars) 
 
 
Source: World Investment Report, 2011:291; Annex Table 1.2 
 
The New York Times identifies China as The country in Asia for future FDI 
and described the situation as: “China is grabbing much of the new foreign 
investment in Asia, leaving its once-glittering neighbors (Thailand, South 
0
500.000
1.000.000
1.500.000
2.000.000
2.500.000
3.000.000
3.500.000
1990
2000
2010
 
 
 3
Korea, and Singapore) with crumbs (New York Times, 2006).” The 
Economist states that in the early 1980s China was already the world’s tenth 
biggest economy (The Economist, 2006).  In 2010, China maintained its 
strong surge upward, growing by a robust 10.3% (See Table 1-1).  
 
Table 1-1 GDP Growth of China 2002-2007 
  2004 2007 2008 2009 2010 
GDP growth 
(in %) 
10,1 11,4 9,6 9,2 10,3 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from Statistical Yearbook 2008 
 
The questions are: How attractive is Singapore concerning foreign 
investment and can it be as competitive as China or Hong Kong? A 
comparison between Singapore and other Asian countries might help answer 
these questions. Figure 1-3 compares the top 10 FDI recipients in South, 
East and South-East Asia. China, Hong Kong and Singapore form the top 
group of FDI inflow. India is approaching the level of Singapore with 23 billion 
USD FDI in 2007.  
Figure 1-3 South, East and South-East Asia:  
Top 10 Recipients of FDI Inflows (2006-2007) in billions of USD 
 
Source: UNCTAD, FDI/TNC database and annex table B.1 
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Concerning Research and Development (R&D) in Asia this sector has also 
been increasing in line with the increase of global FDI.  Figure 1-4 states that 
Singapore has been number two concerning annual average growth rate in 
R&D expenditure 1991 -2001 worldwide.  
 
Figure 1-4 Growth of R&D expenditure, annual average growth rate 1999-2001 1 
 
Source: Anderson, 2005:26 
 
In 2002 there were 14,502 wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS) in Singapore 
(World Investment Report, 2006:271). The trend of today’s worldwide 
globalization in this city state is demonstrated by the presence of 7,000 
foreign MNCs coming from a broad variety of industries, geographies and 
competencies in 2006. 330 MNCs have given Singapore a Headquarters (HQ) 
status and another 4,000 carry out their global and regional functions from 
the country (EDB, 2007).  The significance of this high concentration of 
MNCs in such a small city state will be the focus of the thesis. With China 
offering many advantages for FDI, this thesis presents Singapore as an 
alternative entry point to the Asian market. The questions addressing MNCs 
concerning this decision as well as the problems and advantages this market 
contains will be presented in the next chapter. 
                                                 
1 Based on national currencies in constant prices; There is a break in series for China 
between 1999 and 2000, breaks in the series for the United States in 1997 and 1998 and the 
US date for 2002 and 2003 are provisional. 
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1.2 Research Questions 
As it has always been difficult to enter a new market, it will even get harder if 
the new market is located in Asia. This thesis elaborates on different market 
entry strategies towards Singapore. It will be helpful for Western companies, 
to get to know the market in Singapore and its context in the Southeast Asia 
region. For some reasons many MNCs have made the decision to enter 
Singapore for expanding to Asia. This thesis will work out the reasons why 
Singapore holds a strategic unique position among the developing countries 
in Asia and why it is so attractive to foreign investors. The market in 
Singapore itself will be presented regarding business potential and new 
opportunities, but also in terms of limitations, problems and cultural 
differences. The thesis will elaborate on different entry strategies for 
Singapore and will present arguments whether supporting or not the chosen 
entry mode respectively. The thesis will deal with the following questions: 
 What does the market in Singapore look like for MNCs? 
 What are the advantages of moving a business to Singapore? 
 What are the challenges and problems of doing business in Singapore? 
 Is there a generally advised strategy concerning the entry mode to 
Singapore? 
 How to find the right business partner in Singapore? 
 How useful is the Guanxi2 [pronounced as “gwan-she”] factor for the 
entry strategy of a MNC? 
People who have never been exposed to the Asian culture will get helpful 
information about the business environment in Singapore. 
 
1.3 Motivations for this thesis 
This thesis should give supportive explanations about the difference in doing 
business in Singapore. Due to cultural differences, Western companies are 
highly challenged to find the right business partner. The cultural gap between 
Western and Asian cultures is obviously large but often underestimated. The 
                                                 
2 This thesis makes use of the pinyin system of Romanization of Chinese characters 
developed on mainland China 
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mistake of judging compatibility at a broad level and using national, ethnic of 
cultural matches are even done among Asian firms. For example many 
Singaporean firms believe that their shared Chinese heritage makes for ideal 
partnerships with Chinese and Singaporean firms. The danger of this 
hypothesis is shown in the numerous cases of failed alliances even between 
Singaporean and Chinese firms, and by the failure of Singaporean firms in 
China, because of unexpected cultural and other incompatibilities. 
Compatibility has to be established at the strategic level of firms’ intents and 
strategies, and at the operational levels at which interaction between the 
firms and their people actually takes place (Singh, Delios, 2005:207). 
Nevertheless, Western managers still need to be aware of the Chinese 
heritage of many Singaporeans, but at the same time they are loyal to 
Singapore and not to China. Some MNCs believe that Asians want to 
consume the same products as Europeans and they are able and ready to 
pay similar prices. Other MNCs commit the same mistake but from another 
perspective, saying that Asians do accept older products and out-dated 
technology but are unable to afford them. Both of these theories are correct 
in some markets in Asia, but they are definitely wrong in other markets. 
Knowing the Asian customer and identifying the business environment in 
Asia will help to develop the appropriate strategies for MNCs (Singh, Delios, 
2005:15). Shane (1994) discovered that national culture - especially the 
levels of trust – have an impact on the choice of the entry mode to the foreign 
market. Can this be true for Singapore as well? The scope of this thesis is 
therefore to evaluate the market in Singapore concerning new business 
opportunities for Western companies and how this market is to enter. It will 
show the importance of dealing with Guanxi while doing business with Asian 
partners in Singapore and will focus on how to develop “my own” Guanxi in 
the business world. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This paper is organized in the following manner: 
i. An introduction of Singapore from a historical and economical point of 
view.  
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ii. The important role of the Singaporean government and its influence 
on the economical development will be presented followed by tax 
incentives provided by the government to attract MNCs to Singapore. 
iii. The roots and the theoretical background of the Guanxi factor is 
explained and briefly discussed in the Singaporean context. This part 
will not only define the term Guanxi but will also show how this is 
applicable to Western companies for their investment in Singapore. 
iv. How these challenges can be managed in regard to different entry 
modes for foreign companies moving to Singapore. 
v. The practical aspect of this work holds a view on the case study of 
TRUMPF, which is a German manufacturing leader in production 
technology. The internationalization process of this company from an 
organizational perspective is briefly described and will point out the 
pros and cons of doing business in Singapore and how they are 
managing the cultural gap between Germany and Singapore. 
vi. Important concluding remarks are presented concerning the future 
outlook of Singapore and what new challenges MNCs are facing in the 
short, middle and long run. 
 
 
2 Analysis of the Market: Singapore 
2.1 The Environment of the Asian Market 
Before the business market in Singapore will be explained it is crucial to 
provide information about the general differences of the Asian market 
compared to Europe.  In 2005, Singh and Delios identified several new key 
factors in the Asian business environment which are significant and unique 
for the Asian market. The key elements of the environment are called 
“PESTs”, meaning: political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological 
factors. Their importance can vary across industries. In mobile 
telecommunications, for example, technological change is a major driver of 
demand for many products and services, while political considerations often 
represent major constraints on firms, such as allowance of 100% foreign 
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equity owners. These are the major PEST trends in Asia (Singh, Delios, 
2005:25):  
 
1. Political factors 
 Growing acceptance of the benefits of free trade and foreign 
investment 
 Increasing resistance by non-government organization to 
“globalization” 
 General decrease in political risks 
 More local and other free trade agreements 
 Government protection of domestic firms and industries is 
decreasing and becoming less effective 
 
2. Economic factors 
 Fewer obstacles to trade, investments, and financial flows 
 Increases trade and investment flows 
 Improved institutional frameworks for trade, investment and 
business Continued growth of China, the emergence of India, and 
the relative decline of Southeast Asia 
 Growing risk of contagion within and across regions during 
economic and financial crises 
 
3. Socio-cultural factors 
 Increasing educated, trained and competent consumers and 
populations 
 Continuing convergence in consumer needs, desires, and wants 
 Growing disposable income in East Asia 
 Easier and greater movement of skilled manpower within and 
outside Asia 
 Emerging pressures for greater corporate social responsibility 
 Trend of ageing populations in many Asian countries in the long 
run 
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4. Technological factors 
 More rapid and disruptive change in technology 
 Greater ability of emerging economies to utilize and absorb 
technology 
 Widespread diffusion of information and communication 
technologies, allowing broader geographic dispersion and 
integration of business activities 
 Changing “make or buy “ decision and less defined firm boundaries 
 
Now that that the big picture of Asia has been described, a close look at the 
country profile of Singapore is needed for a better understanding of its 
market. 
 
2.2 Key facts of Singapore 
Singapore rests along the equator and is located between Malaysia and 
Indonesia (See Figure 2-1). 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Map of Singapore 
 
Source: CIA Factbook 2010 
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The small size of Singapore (697 sq km) would indicate a less importance 
meaning from an economical view, but with only 5,1 million people and a 
gross national product per capita of 62.100 USD this city state country is 
playing in the same league as high developed countries like the US (43,500 
USD) or the average of European Union (EU27) (29,400 USD) (see Table 2-
1).  
 
 
Table 2-1 Key facts of Singapore compared to the USA, EU27 and the World 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from CIA World Factbook July 2010,  
Department of Statistics Singapore, 2011:40 
 
A look at the GDP growth rate in Singapore shows an overall increase since 
2003 again. Singapore suffered from 2001-2003 under the global recession 
and the decline in the technology sector. On top of that tourism and 
consumers spending were hit hard by the outbreak of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The real GDP growth rate between 2004 and 
2007 was on average 7%.  Due to the financial crisis GDP growth dropped 
down to 1.2% in 2008 (SINGSTAT, 2009). 
 
2.3 Limitations of the analysis of Singapore 
Hence Singapore consists of so many ethnic groups this thesis work will only 
focus on the Chinese ethnic group.  It is not stated that Malays and Indians 
 Singapore USA Austria World 
Area (sq km) 697 9826,68k 83,87k 510072 
Capital city 
Singapore 
Washington 
D.C. 
Vienna n/a 
Population  5,1 mil. 313,2 mil. 8,2 mil. 6,9 bil. 
GDP (USD) 291.9 bil. 14,66 trillion 332 bil. 46, 66 trillion 
GNP per 
Capita (USD) 
62.100 43,500 40.400 11.200 
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have no influence on the culture in Singapore but this thesis only focuses on 
the Chinese and the characteristics of this culture. 
2.4 Infrastructure of Singapore 
Singapore is a highly developed country and shows a strong infrastructure. A 
world class public transportation and the latest communication system are 
just few examples. Here are some facts about the infrastructure: 
Port of Singapore 
Singapore holds the biggest and busiest container port worldwide (PSA, 
2009). This largest transshipment hub is managed by Singapore Terminals 
Corporation Ltd. (PSA) 3 , which handled 23.98 million of Twenty-Foot 
Container Equivalent Unit (TEU)s in 2006. There are four main Terminals in 
Singapore:  
 Tanjong Pagar 
 Keppel  
 Brani  
 Pasier Panjang  
Singapore deals with 200 shipping lines and has connections to 600 ports in 
123 countries (PSA, 2009).  This means daily sailings to every major port 
worldwide (See Table 2-3).  
Table 2-2 Daily Destinations from Singapore 
Destination Daily Frequency 
USA 2 
Europe 4 
Japan 5 
China, HK and Taiwan 9 
South and Southeast Asia 70 
 
Source: PSA, 2009 
 
Figure 2-2 shows that the busiest transshipment hub of the world is situated 
in Singapore and points out the strategic position of Singapore 
 
                                                 
3 Formerly known as Port of Singapore Authority 
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Figure 2-2 Transportation Network of Singapore's port 
 
 
Source: PSA, 2009 
 
Airport 
There is one airport in Singapore, Changi Airport, with 80 airlines operating 
over 4,000 weekly scheduled flights to more than 57 countries (Airliner 2008). 
 
Road 
Space is rare in Singapore. That is why paved roads only have a length of 
3,234 km, which already includes 150km of expressways (CIA Factbook, 
2008) 
 
Water 
The small size of Singapore and the increasing demand for water make 
water to a precious resource. Therefore rainwater is collected in the 
catchments in the reservoirs. 50% of the area of Singaporean is used as 
catchments to collect rainwater as much as possible. The government 
encourages the people to save water by all means since the demand for 
water is continuously increasing and space is also limited in this small city-
state.  With new projects like water reclamation started in 2003 and building 
new water reservoirs, drains, canals launched in 2005, Singapore aims for 
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preserve the water supply in the country (Ministry of Environment and Water 
Resources, 2009). 
 
Energy 
Singapore has a stable and safe power supply. In 2004 the energy 
production in Singapore accounted 32.6 billion kilowatt hours coming from: oil 
(89%), natural gas (11%), coal (0%), nuclear (0%), hydroelectricity (0%), and 
other renewables (0%).  All fossil fuels have to be imported (EIA, 2007). 
 
2.5 Historical Development  
Singapore was inhabited by a small Malay community when the British East 
India Company decided to purchase it in 1918. With the efforts of Sir T.S. 
Raffles Singapore could develop rapidly and became the center of 
government for the newly created Straits Settlements Colony4. During World 
War II Japan was occupying Singapore from 1942 till 1945. This change 
weakened British control so that Singapore became self-governing in 1959. 
(Chow ed all, 1997:551) On September 16, 1963 Singapore joined with 
Malaya, Sarawak and Sabah5 the Malaysian Federation but two years later, 
on the 9th of August 1965, Singapore became a separate nation due to 
tensions between Malays and ethnic Chinese. Singapore consequently 
developed to one of the world's most prosperous countries with strong 
international trading links (its port is one of the world's busiest in terms of 
tonnage handled) and with per capita GDP equal to that of the leading 
nations of Western Europe (CIA World Factbook, 2006). 
2.6 Economical Development 
Singapore, a highly developed and successful free market economy, enjoys 
a remarkably open and corruption-free environment with stable prices. In 
1990 the United Nations identified Singapore as a Newly Industrialized 
Economy (NIE) due to its rapid growth. Literature also names them as “Four 
Asian Tigers” or “Four Little Dragons” (Singapore, HK, Taiwan and South 
                                                 
4 The Straits Settlements, the British Crown Colony that existed 1826-1946 
5Malaya , Sarawak and Sabah are Malaysian provinces on the Island Borneo 
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Korea). From then on the strategic economic plan was to change Singapore 
into a developed country (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2004:5). The absence of 
natural resources in Singapore and only having a small domestic market, 
economical growth had to depend on increasing exports (Tamney, 1995:8). 
In the 2009 World Competitiveness Scoreboard Singapore was ranked as 
number three in overall economic competitiveness (IMD, 2009). According to 
Tamney (1995:9) the importance of Singapore’s economic growth is 
incorporated in people’s mind as well as controlled by a powerful government. 
The strong government in Singapore represents also a distinctive aspect in 
comparison with other East Asian countries such as South Korea, Japan and 
Taiwan. Foreign Corporation would be provided with political power, but due 
to the fact that the government of Singapore is cooperative, they are not 
interested in this power.  
During the 1990s Singapore experienced a rapid growth and development. In 
the years between 1990 and 1997 economic growth was accounted for 
approximately 9% and the inflation rate averaged over 2% (Singapore 2005: 
18).  Furthermore in the years between 1990 and 1997 two economic crises 
occurred; the East Asian Financial Crisis (1997-1998) and the SARS 
outbreak. The East Asian Financial Crisis was characterized by an increasing 
unemployment rate and an intense decrease of currency value.  In contrast 
to other East Asian countries, Singapore was undergoing a short and 
relatively minor crisis due to superior macroeconomic and structural 
fundamentals. In 2001 Singapore was hit again by regional financial crisis 
which led to decreases in GDP and Exports. Nevertheless, Singapore 
recovered from these crises and increased economic growth in the following 
years (Singapore 2005:19). On the other hand, the SARS outbreak led to a 
recession in 2003 which was marked by standing exports and declining 
growth rates. However, a weak demand in imports and the strong export 
growth caused a considerable increase in the current account surplus, 
approximately 30% of GDP. Moreover, due to increasing export demand 
economic growth of Singapore continued to rise (Singapore 2005:19). 
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2.7 Cultural Development  
Defining the Singaporean culture requires a wide view on the different 
aspects. (Tamney, 1995:19) Singaporeans are facing Western influences 
because they meet tourist, read English-language books, newspapers, and 
consume English-language mass media products. Nevertheless, they remain 
Asian with the aim of continue enjoying economic growth and social peace. 
The fact that a pure Singaporean culture is hard to define, leads to the use of 
Chinese, Indian, and Malay cultural traditions. That is why Singapore is 
called a multi race country (Chow et al., 1997:551). Figure 2-3 shows the 
composition of ethnic groups in Singapore in 2008.  
 
Figure 2-3 Ethnic Groups in Singapore 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from CIA Factbook, 2011 
 
With 76.8% the Chinese people represents the largest ethnic group followed 
by Malays with 13.9% and Indian with 7.9%.  Therefore Singapore’s culture 
also contains different subcultures, ergo different spoken languages, as well. 
With four official languages (English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil) the 
government is reacting to the high amount of ethnic groups in this small 
country. Figure 2-4 reflects the percentage of each spoken language in 
Singapore in 2008. Mandarin Chinese is the most spoken language in 
Singapore with 35% of the population, followed by English with 23%. 
Although English is ranked on the second place, it is the language for 
76,80%
13,90%
7,90%
1,40%
Ethnic Groups in Singapore 2011
Chinese
Malay
Indian
other
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administration affairs and also utilized in court. 14.1% of the population 
speaks Malay and Tamil is only used by 3.2%.  
 
Figure 2-4 Languages spoken in Singapore 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from CIA Factbook, 2011 
2.8 The 5 Cs in Singapore 
With the fast economical growth in Singapore materialism also have come to 
existence in people’s mind living there. Through personal communications 
with locals in Singapore6 the “5 Cs” was often used in order to name the 
ultimate goal in this society and the Singaporean version of living the 
American Dream. The five goals in materialism are the following: Car, Cash, 
Credit Card, Condominium and Country Club. These things define the status 
quo in the Singaporean society. 
 
Car 
The small size of this country forces the government to take action in order to 
manage and limit the amount of cars in Singapore (LTA 2007). Car 
ownership comes along with high cost, such as: (1) Registration fee, (2) Cost 
Price, (3) Road Tax via Electronic Road Pricing (ERP)7, (4) Certificate of 
                                                 
6 Personal interviews with people on the streets were conducted by the author.  
7 ERP became operational in September 1998 in Singapore and replaced the manual 
congestion pricing schemes in the Central Business District and expressways 
35%
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14,10%
11,40%
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3,20% 1,80% 0,90%
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Entitlement (COE)8, (5) Additional registration fee (140% of open market 
value (OMV) and (6) Customs duty (31% of OMV). All these obstacles make 
driving in Singapore to an exclusive privilege. In 2008 the total vehicle 
population counts 894,682 cars (The Europe World Yearbook, 2009:4042). In 
2010 this number has grown to 945,829 cars (Yearbook of Statistic 
Singapore, 2011:180).  
 
Cash 
Cash is self explanatory and the universal symbol for purchasing power. 
Therefore, Singaporeans are striving for ways to collect as much cash as 
they can in order to retrieve financial security. 
 
Credit Card 
This paying device enjoys high popularity among Singaporeans. But the 
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), which is the eye of the government 
on the financial sector, has laid down many requirements to qualify for basic 
cards at banks (HSBC, UOB, DBS, etc.): 
 30,000 SGD minimum annual income for Singapore Citizens/ 
Residents 
 40,000 SGD9 minimum annual income for Non-Singapore Citizens/ 
Non-Singapore Permanent Residents 
 If the minimum income requirement is not met, a minimum fixed 
deposit of 10,000 SGD is required as collateral. 
 
Condominium 
Space is rare in Singapore, freestanding houses are hard to find and often 
only available to the high society of Singapore. Therefore, people from the 
middle class are seeking for condominiums, as they stand for luxurious 
housing in Singapore and often include additional facilities like swimming 
pool, sauna and private gym. 
 
                                                 
8 To reduce traffic congestion, in May 1990 the Land Transport Authority (LTA) introduced a 
private vehicle ownership scheme known as the Certificate of Entitlement (COE). A COE is 
necessary to own a car and is obtained through a closed-bid auction. 
9 United Overseas Bank even asks for 80,000 SGD 
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Country Club  
There is a very small amount of golf courses and country clubs in Singapore 
due to limited space. Accomplishments to hold a membership in those rare 
clubs are highly recognized in this society. 
 
2.9  The Government in Singapore 
The government and the president are both elected by universal suffrage, but 
the ruling of the People’s Action Party, re-elected continuously since 1959 
(USDS, 2009) and its manipulation of media and smothering protest puts the 
political system in Singapore the middle between democracy and 
authoritarianism (Singapore, 2005:13).  As the sixth president of Singapore, 
elected in 1999 and re-elected in 2005, Sellapan Rama Nathan is the first 
representative of this country. The head of government is portrayed by Prime 
Minister Lee, Hsien Long, since 2004 (Factbook, 2011). Singapore intended 
to become an integral cog in the international production networks of foreign-
controlled industries and therefore, the strategy of the government was to 
pursue an open door policy with trade and financial liberalization as core 
elements (Ritchie, 2001:6). A study of companies ranked Singapore better 
than Taiwan, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Japan concerning corporate 
governance in 1997 (PWC, 1999). A more recent study (PWC, 2000) rated 
Singapore as second only to Australia among principal markets with 
reference to auditing and compliance, accountability to shareholders, 
disclosure and transparency and board processes. This rating is important in 
as much as 76% of Asian Chief Executive Officers (CEO)s consider 
corporate governance as a key factor in attracting foreign capital and 
investments and eight out of ten Asian CEOs view it to be an important 
consideration in selecting business partners (Gonzalez, 2004:316). 
According to CG Watch 2004, reported by CLSA and Asia Corporate 
Governance Association (ACGA), Singapore, Hong Kong and India are listed 
as the top three markets ranked by corporate governance (CG, 2004).  
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2.9.1 The Influence of PAP on the Economy  
Until the mid-1990s, FDI from Singapore was relatively insignificant, heavily 
concentrated in neighboring Malaysia, and focused on the manufacturing and 
financial services sectors. To increase FDI, in 1994 the Government 
introduced a regionalization strategy with two distinct objectives: to facilitate 
FDI by Singaporean enterprises and to transform Singapore into a regional 
headquarters for translational corporations (TNCs) operating in Asia (World 
Investment Report, 2006:214). The Singaporean took pro-active 
microeconomic measures to help businesses through a lot of governmental 
agencies. The executing hand of the government in Singapore for promoting 
FDI and foreign trade is the Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB), 
which was established in 1961 under the Ministry of Finance (MOF). EDB 
provides leans and equity financing, industrial training schemes and 
marketing assistance.  Foreign governments and companies are maintaining 
industry training centers and institutes of technology together with EDB (EDB, 
2007). Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) has also its roots in the EDB and was 
formally incorporated in 1968 (JTC, 2007) to offers key physical infrastructure 
for industrial sites like building and cargo handling facilities. The Monetary 
Authority of Singapore (MAS) is in charge of the financial sector in Singapore 
and controls every step regarding financial issues. As the government’s trade 
promotion agency International Enterprise (IE) Singapore supports the goals 
of EDB and is reinforced by others like DBS, National Science and 
Technology Board (NSTB), Singapore Institute of Standards and Trade 
Development (TDB). Standards, Productivity and Innovation Board (SPRING) 
grants quality assurance for products and services and works on the 
reduction of technical barriers to trade. Last but not least, Maritime and Port 
Authority of Singapore (MPA) and Singapore Tourism Board (STB) are also 
there to provide trade information and assist companies in their globalization 
plans. 
2.9.2 Critical view on the government in Singapore 
Singapore has been characterized by an extremely active state industrial 
policy (Nolan, 1993:73).  The former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew argued 
(The Economist, 1986:4): “You concentrate on those skills, on those products, 
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which will sweep the market.” The Economist describes the strategy of 
Singapore as (The Economist, 1986:6): “Singapore picked some early 
winners, like shipping and ship-repairing. It happened on others, like ship 
building, oilrig-building, printing and electronics. It established an excellent 
airport, airline and postal and communications service as a business-
promoting infrastructure. It avoided areas like textiles, vulnerable to regional 
competition and Western protectionism. And it made a few mistakes.” The 
fast economic growth is often associated with the strict policy of the former 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew10 and his ideas of a strong Singapore (Country 
Profile, 2007:4). 
In Singapore, Republic of Korea and Taiwan the state was faced with a much 
larger and less manipulate workforce. In each case the labor market was 
kept “free” via direct state action (Nolan, 1993:77). The initially belligerent, 
communist-led trade unions were incorporated in Singapore into the state 
decision-making process (wages are largely fixed by the tripartite National 
Wages Council, including employers, trade unions, and government) and the 
Communist Party was outlawed (Deco, 1987:150). Florian von Alten 
analyzed the influence of the government on the economy in 1995. He 
discovered that Singapore’s economic development is mainly a political 
process, decided upon and guided by a strong government determined to 
overcome the country’s backward economic status and to enter the first 
league of industrialized nation in the beginning of the next century. The 
existence of government interventions in Singapore suggest that a passive 
state, as argued by classical and neo-classical economists, is not necessary 
condition for rapid economic growth. Government activities do not have to be 
disastrous per se (von Alten, 1995:230). Surprisingly, this result is in 
contradiction to Michael Porter’s theory as to which a government cannot 
create directly a competitive advantage in a country (Porter, 1990:86). 
There are more worries about the immense influence of the PAP on the 
economy. The ongoing interventions may ultimately hold back the economic 
development of Singapore. A sector in particular is the financial service 
industry. There is complaining about the tight control on information and 
                                                 
10 The Prime Minister from 1959 until 1990 
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intolerance of public criticism of government policies, which could prevent 
Singapore from truly turning into a financial center for South-East Asia (Chow 
ed all, 1997:557).  
2.9.3 Investment Incentives provided by the Government 
There are many ways through which the government has led the direction of 
economic change of Singapore (Smith, 1985:82): 
 An initial phase of protection for selected industries 
 Incentives to MNCs to invest in selected sectors 
 High state investments in education to encourage skill-based activities 
(e.g. finance for high-tech industries) 
 Orchestrated wage rises to encourage investment in high valued 
added industries 
 Huge state investment in telecommunications which is seen by the 
government as part of the strategic investment in the infrastructure of 
the economy rather than as a profit-maker in itself 
The government issued tax incentives to attract foreign investment into 
selected core industries, e.g. foreign companies in selected core industries 
are entitled to tax exemption for five to ten years due to the Pioneer Status 
Scheme (Islam and Chowdhury, 1997:206). Double deductions for approval 
R&D expenditure, concessional tax rates for approved operational 
headquarters and expansion incentives are provided by the government.  For 
details about all tax incentives see in Appendix 9-3 until 9-13. 
 
2.9.4 Taxation in Singapore  
Singapore is able offer an attractive environment for international business in 
regard of taxation. The white paper on Goods and Service Tax (GST) with a 
rate of 3% was approved on April 1, 1994 and was part of a tax reform effort 
striving for a reduction of fiscal reliance on direct (income) taxation. By 
reducing the burden of income taxation Singapore aimed at preserving the 
incentive to work, encouraging enterprises and maintaining international 
competitiveness to attract foreign talent and investments. Additionally, in 
regard to the rapidly aging population GST was considered to provide a more 
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stable tax revenue resource (Poh, 2003: 52). GST was raised from 3% to 4% 
on 1 January 2003 and was raised again from 4% to 5% on 1 January 2004. 
The last increase from 5% to 7% was approved in July 2007 (MOF, 2007). 
The increase of 2% is argued to fit into the actual economical situation in 
Singapore and should not be implemented when Singapore is passing a 
recession. "It is not just an offset package to deal with the GST. It is a whole 
set of measures which we are taking in order to tilt the playing field in favor of 
the lower income group, which is what we have to add and tally in the 
balance ... It's part of being one society. I'm not going to tax 15% on income 
tax, I'm not going to tax 25% from GST the way the Scandinavians do, but I 
have to make the adjustments of 2% which I think is fair and I think 
Singaporeans will support," added Mr. Lee (Channel News Asia, 2006).   
Corporate income taxes were introduced in 1965 with a rate of 40% until 
1986 (See table 9-21).  With the continuously decreasing corporate tax rate 
over the years, various foreign companies were moving to Singapore to 
conduct businesses.  In 2007, corporate tax is set at 20% and faced another 
reduction in 2008 according to IRAS (2007). This projected decrease should 
have to make sure that Singapore belongs to one of the countries with the 
lowest corporate tax rate worldwide. Table 2-3 lists countries by their 
effective corporate tax rates from 2005 and shows that Singapore is leading 
the list in regard of the marginal effective rate. In 2011 the corporate income 
tax rate in Singapore has been reduced again to 17% (IRAS, 2011). This 
proves again the intention of the government to maintain an attractive tax 
environment for foreign and local business.  
 
Table 2-3 Comparison of Corporate Tax Rate worldwide (2005)  
Country Corporate Income 
Tax Rate (in %) 
Effective Tax Rate 
(in %)11 
China 24 45.8 
Canada 34.3 39 
Brazil 34.6 38.5 
US 39.2 37.7 
Germany 38.4 36.9 
Italy 39.4 36.2 
Russia 22 34.5 
                                                 
11 The marginal effective tax rate is the tax paid as a percentage of the pre-tax return to 
capital, under the statement that the after-tax rate of return is sufficient to cover the cost of 
equity and debt finance given by international lenders. 
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Japan 41.9 33.6 
France 35.4 33.3 
Korea 27.5 30.8 
New Zealand 33 29.3 
Greece 32 29.3 
Spain 35 27.3 
Norway 28 25.1 
Netherlands  31.5 25 
India 33 24.3 
Australia 30 24.1 
Finland 26 22.9 
Luxembourg 30.4 21.9 
United Kingdom 30 21.7 
Belgium 34 21.4 
Poland 19 20.2 
Denmark 30 19.8 
Austria 25 19.4 
Hungary 16 18.2 
Czech Republic 26 17.7 
Switzerland 22 17 
Mexico 30 16.7 
Ireland 12.5 13.7 
Portugal 27.5 13.5 
Sweden 28 12.1 
Iceland 18 12.1 
Slovak Republic 19 9.1 
Hong Kong 17.5 8.1 
Turkey 30 6.4 
Singapore 20 6.2 
 
Source: C.D. Howe Institute, 2005 
 
By remitting the overseas income into Singapore a company in Singapore 
can front double taxation. In order to avoid this situation, a resident company 
is entitled to the benefits conferred under the Avoidance of Double Taxation 
Agreements (DTA) that Singapore has approved. Singapore has entered into 
54 comprehensive, 7 limited DTAs worldwide and 8 treaties, which are 
signed but not ratified. See in Appendix table 9-14 till 9-17 for more details 
about those countries.  
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3 Management Strategy for Western Companies 
3.1 Reasons for going to Singapore 
When weighing the pro and the cons of the business environment of 
Singapore these five reasons give a favorable opinion of this business 
location: 
1. Strategic Location 
Due to its location Singapore holds the 4th position ahead of New York (5) 
and Tokyo (9) for being as the most vital international air travel hub in the 
world according to the National Academy of Science, 2005 
 
2. Close Proximity to Regional Markets 
Since Singapore is a member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations), business ideas can easily reach this combined market of over 
500 million people in Asia. 
 
3. Reasonable Corporate Tax – from 2010 onwards only 17%  (See 
Appendix table 9-24) 
 
4. Low Cost of Living 
Due to a safe and clean environment to live and work Singapore’s 
standard of living can easily keep up with many First World countries. 
Living conditions in Singapore belong to the best in Asia with state-of-the 
art facilities for education, shopping, sports and recreation. The inflation 
rate is comparatively lower than most other countries. Mercer's Cost of 
Living Survey 2009 listed Tokyo, Osaka and Moscow as the most 
expensive cities. Singapore is ranked on the 10th place (See Table 9-2 in 
Appendix). According to a study by accountancy firm KPMG in 2006, 
Singapore belongs to the most cost-competitive business location among 
nine industrialized countries. The bi-annual study - which covers 128 
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cities in nine countries - indicated that Singapore was 22 per cent (see 
Table 3-1) cheaper than the benchmark United States.12 
 
Table 3-1 Cost Competitive Comparison 2006 
Country Cost Index Rank Rank 
Singapore 77.7 1 
Canada 94.5 2 
France 95.6 3 
Netherlands 95.7 4 
Italy 97.8 5 
United Kingdom 98.1 6 
United States 100 7 
Japan 106.9 8 
Germany 107.4 9 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from KPMG Competitive Alternatives Study, 2006 
 
3.2 The Challenges and Risks of Doing Business in 
Singapore 
Singapore offers an attractive environment for foreign business affairs but 
Western companies are in need of understanding the characteristics of this 
location. Alliances with Singaporean partners have to be built with 
carefulness and should have rather pragmatic than unrealistic expectations 
about the outcome of the alliance. In the planning stage firms must consider 
closing costs and salvage values for worst scenarios in Singapore. On top of 
that, overestimating the potential and ignoring the danger of failure is the 
most common mistake in this context (Inkpen, ed all, 2001:144). If 
government intervention or environment uncertainties are expected to be 
high, e.g. Chinese government, firms tend to use Joint Venture as entry 
mode. Since the government in Singapore has strong influence on the 
economy, this would indicate a preference for Joint Ventures in Singapore. 
                                                 
12KPMG’S 2006 Competitive Alternatives study analyses 27 cost components, including 
wages, freight, business taxes, rent and utilities 
 
 
 26
But if FDI is surrounded in an open economy, then wholly owned subsidiary 
(WOS) is preferred. The main considerations about the entry mode must 
secure the firms proprietary knowledge and control over worldwide 
operations (Luo, 2001:465). Singapore does have an open economy, which 
leads to the questions like how attractive are WOS as an entry mode for 
Singapore.  
 
3.3 Cultural differences in Singapore 
Despite the fact that Singapore provides an overall good investment climate 
especially for foreign businesses with its strategic location, physical and 
financial infrastructure, human resources and political and social stability 
(Chia, 2000:1998), entering this new market still requires local knowledge of 
the country itself. The early theory of organization forms implies that structure 
follows the chosen strategy (Chandler, 1962:314). But in terms of 
globalization, cultural differences have also impact on the organization forms 
of MNC and especially their networks today. The concept of business 
networks is globally recognized but holds a prevailing position especially in 
Asia. These networks are identified as Keiretsu in Japan, Chaebol in South 
Korea, the Chinese family business groups across much of all Asian 
countries and the government linked corporation in Singapore (Leung and 
White, 2004:68).  Today, the practice of traditional Chinese Guanxi is still 
present in Singapore as another example of cultural patterning (Kopina, 
2005:490). This thesis will point out the Guanxi factor in Singapore, since the 
Chinese represents the largest ethnic group. 
 
4 Guan Xi Factor in Singapore 
4.1 Where does it come from? 
The existence of the Chinese culture and its history go five thousand years 
back in time (Chung, 1995:50). Singapore is, ethnically, mainly a Chinese 
country, since over 70% of population is Chinese (See Figure 2-3). The 
impressive trade links with China can be explained by the strong trading 
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advantages that overseas Chinese have in the China market (Goodman and 
Segal, 1994:332). The Guanxi (=relationship) belongs to the major dynamics 
in Chinese society and has been a universal factor of the Chinese business 
environment over the past few centuries. It mainly connects millions of 
Chinese firms into a business and social web. Before the meaning of Guanxi 
is explained in the context of doing business, the original definition of this 
term must be found. 
4.2 Definition of Guanxi 
Guanxi, which is loosely translated in English as ‘relationships’, has 
developed from one of the deepest roots in Chinese culture (Luo, 2001:2).  
As Guanxi has been used in speeches for centuries in China; surprisingly, it 
does not appear in either of the classic Chinese dictionaries, Ci Yuan (词源) 
(”Source of Words“) published in 1915 or Ci Hai (词海) published in 1936.  
The term Guanxi(关系) consists of two Chinese characters. An isolated view 
will help to understand the meaning of each character and the implication of 
the combination of Guan and Xi. Lou Yadong approaches from this direction: 
 
 (关)Guan firstly means a door, and secondly, “to close up”. From a 
metaphorically perspective inside the door the individual is “one of us” 
but outside the door one’s existence is hardly recognized. So the key 
is to overcome this obstacle by passing through this door. Additionally, 
Guan can stand for “doing someone a favor”. For example, Guanxin 
means “showing solitude for”. 
 
 (系)Xi implies to tie up and extend relationships, such as kinship (Shi 
xi) and directly-related members of one’s family 直系亲属 (Zhi xi qin 
shu). It implicates formalization and hierarchy. Although the world 
applies to individuals, in the first place, the concept can also be used 
similarly with organizations (e.g. Xi means “department”. Last but not 
least, Xi can also refer to maintaining long term relationship (Weixi 
means “to maintain”)  (Luo, 2000:2) 
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Guanxi is a deceptive and intricate concept compared the English word 
“relationships”, (Kipnis, 1997; Dunfee and Warren, 2001) which cannot be 
clarified with a single definition (Law, 2004).  
Here are some semantic meanings: 
 Gate or pass (Yeung and Tung, 1996:54) 
 Interpersonal Connections (Xin and Pearce, 1996:1641; Leung, 
1996:749) 
 Networking to create win-to-win situation (Haley, Usha C.V. and Haley, 
George T. 2006:49) 
 
Guanxi stands for a system of debts, obligations and favors among 
individuals. Guanxi is also closely linked to Renqing (favor), and Li (etiquette, 
propriety, and rules of conduct) and Mianzi (face) in regulating relationships 
(Ghauri P. and Fang T. 2001:309). The face not only represents one’s 
position in the Chinese society, but is also among the highest qualities of 
being an individual in the Chinese living culture, so that criticizing someone in 
public can result in the loss of his face and therefore, this situation should be 
avoided. Through the time new terms associated with Guanxi have come to 
existence and immediately permeating the society. Table 4-1 shows the used 
terms in Chinese society and their meanings: 
 
Table 4-1 Guanxi terms in Chinese society 
Chinese 
Character 
Pronunciation Meaning 
拉关系 La guanxi “Pull” guanxi means to get on the good 
side of someone and store social 
capital with him or her; it carries no 
negative overtones 
挂关系 Gua guanxi “work on” guanxi means almost the 
same thing, but has more general, less 
intense feeling and usually has 
negative overtones 
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关系够呛 Guanxi gou qiang “guanxi made ruined” means the 
relationship has gone bad 
理顺关系 Li shun guanxi “straighten out” guanxi” 
关系网 Guanxi wang “Guanxi wang” represents the guanxi 
network 
关系户 Guanxi hu “Guanxi hu” stands for the guanxi family 
 
Source: Yeung 1996, Luo 2001, Dunning 2007 
 
Guan Xi can be very powerful and useful instrument to reach goals in Asia 
but it can also be an obstacle which is hardly to overcome if people don’t 
know how to handle this special factor.   
 
4.3 Core Elements of Guanxi 
Guanxi is regarded as the key determinant of the performance of an 
organization or the lifeblood of the Chinese business community (Luo and 
Chen, 1997:2). Meaning any entry mode to Singapore should also consider 
this principle for a successfully start.  
The following figure 4-1 describes the concept of Guanxi. (1) The social basis 
lays down the foundation where Guanxi can exist, e.g. at workplace or 
among friendships. (2) Moral behavior is the motivation of Guanxi and can be 
driven by respect, love or peace, for instance. (3) Another influencing factor 
on Guanxi is the fact that Guanxi is embedded in the Chinese social modes, 
also known as Wu Lun. According to Confucianism an individual is a 
relational being. Social order and stability depend on properly differentiated 
role relationship and occurs in these five cardinal relationship roles: (Berling, 
1982:5): 
 boss ruler, prince -subject 
 father-son 
 husband-wife 
 older- younger brother  
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 friend-friend. 
 
These three factors are rooted from Confucian thoughts and do inherently 
influence the concept of Guanxi, which has the following nine main 
characteristics. (1) Guanxi is transferable, which means that if A has Guanxi 
with B and C is a friend of B, then C may be introduced to A by B. (2) The 
reciprocity of Guanxi deals with the fact that not following rules or refusing to 
return the favors will automatically result in the lost of someone’s face and 
that person will be seen as untrustworthy. (3) Guanxi is intangible, i.e. that 
there is no certain or fix amount of favors, which has to be exchanged in 
order to maintain Guanxi. But once Guanxi is established between two 
people this unspoken relationship is always heading for the long run, which is 
meant by characteristic point long-term (7). (4) Guanxi is mainly utilitarian 
than emotional. The connection between the members of the Guanxi family is 
bounded by the exchange of favors and not by expressed feelings. (5) 
Guanxi has always a defined context and is related to a certain situation, 
which means that kinds of exchanged favors are always particular and 
dependent on the contextual situation in order to overcome the certain 
obstacle by passing through the Guanxi door. This makes Guanxi to a 
specialty (6) and its existence cannot be reproduced in another context. The 
process of establishing Guanxi between to individuals has a long durance 
and therefore aimed for a long term process (7). This means that all efforts in 
building up this relationship will also define someone’s future (8) and the 
success is dependent on each personality (9) of the person, who using 
Guanxi. Once Guanxi is established it can be utilized in the social political life, 
e.g. with Guanxi individuals are given a way to get around rules in order to 
overcome cumbersome Chinese bureaucracy (Luo, 1997:46). Another usage 
for Guanxi can be found in business activities and therefore these areas do 
finally form Chinese societies and economies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 31
Figure 4-1 Core Elements in the conceptual framework of Guanxi  
 
 
 Source: Luo, Yadong, 2000:20 
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4.4 Developing “My Own” Guanxi 
The use of the traditional Chinese Guanxi stands for cultural patterning and is 
still relevant in Singapore today. The important meaning of families, friends 
and firms are prevailing in countries with an outstanding Chinese population. 
Ben-Porath (1980) described this phenomenon as the “F-connection”. Now 
that the core concept of Guanxi is clear the following figure 4-2 contains 
suggestions and guidelines how Guanxi can be developed and which actions 
are to take in order to establish this kind of relationship between two people. 
 
Figure 4-2 How to develop Guanxi  
 
Source: Luo, 2000:257 
 
Figure 4-2 does not only show the different ways how Guanxi can be 
developed but even more how it can be improved. (1) Forming a standard 
Guanxi out of the box is not possible since it is always related to the 
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differences. According to a Chinese proverbs the paradoxical nature of 
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Chinese teamwork can be described as “One monk carries his own water, 
two monks share the load, but three monks will be left thirsty to death” Some 
difficulties may occur when Western managers address team performance 
issues with local employees (Hao & Fong, 2000). (2) Hiring locals provides 
extended knowledge about Singapore and helps to adapt the required soft 
skills for an appropriate interaction with Singaporean employees. (3) It is 
important that Western firms construct their own Guanxi. (4) By the use of 
intermediaries the process of finding the right people (5) in Singapore can be 
accelerated. (6) Dispatch Ethnic Chinese is essential since of the high 
amount of Chinese people in Singapore. (7) Monitoring Guanxi gives a brief 
description of the current status of Guanxi. (8) Good Guanxi needs to be 
maintained and it is an ongoing process. By this a firm gains more credibility 
(9) and this again will have a positive influence on the company’s 
performance.  (10) Offering favors to the people in the Guanxi network is an 
effective tool to act correctly in this relationship environment. Although 
Guanxi has a high complexity of its appearance, it is just about building 
interpersonal relationships. Valuing the trust of someone or the well hidden 
sense of obligation and face-giving between the related parties are good 
ways to develop Guanxi (Lim, Selina; Goh, June and Sriramesh, 
Krishnamurthy; 2005:333). 
 
4.5 Managing the Challenges of Guanxi in Singapore 
Chinese society  do have important cultural and social elements like Guanxi, 
which effects significantly on survival,  growth and business operations (Luo, 
2000:122). Guanxi holds its prevailing importance among Chinese societies. 
“Without any Guanxi one simply cannot get anything done” (Davies et al., 
1995:212). According to the study of Bian and Ang in 1997 the percentage of 
those job changers who have succeeded with the help of Guanxi amounts to 
75% in Singapore (Bian, Yanjie; Ang, Soon, 1997:1000). On a micro level 
this means that people are using Guanxi to get in touch with important social 
contacts and obtain useful information. The Chinese society has uplifted 
Guanxi to a high calculated art. Managers, officials and even students follow 
the rules of building and maintaining Guanxi because it is seen as a common 
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deeply rooted preoccupation for these people (Dunning and Changsu 
2007:339). Due to these conditions of the Singaporean environment foreign 
companies have to manage these challenges in order to conduct successful 
business in this country. The best place for foreign companies in regard to 
constructing their own Guanxi network can be found in one of the economic 
hubs in Singapore. In these areas firms from a certain country have come 
together not only in a physically way by renting the same office buildings but 
also in a figural meaning in terms of knowledge sharing. Those companies 
who have already set up a business in Singapore for a long period can be 
addressed or used as information sources in order to get a profound and 
critical market overview of Singapore. Table 4-2 shows a sample of foreign 
based incubators in Singapore: 
 
Table 4-2 Foreign based incubators in Singapore 
Name of the Incubator Target group 
German Center German companies 
Japan Business Support Center Japanese companies 
Nordic European Center All European companies 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
(1) The German Center for Industry and Trade Pte Ltd (GCIT) was founded 
as a non profitable organization in 1995 by the Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg connected to the Financial Group of the savings banks of 
Baden-Württemberg. The aim of GCIT is to provide comprehensive support 
especially for German small and medium-sized companies in their purposes 
to set-up and expand their presence in Asia. 
The German Center network nowadays includes seven locations:  
 Beijing 
 Jakarta 
 Mexico-City  
 Shanghai 
 Singapore 
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 Yokohama 
 
(2) The Japan Business Support Center (BSC) founded in 2001 helps start-
ups and small medium enterprises (SMEs) with origins in Japan to establish 
and grow their operations in Singapore. The Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) facilitates this center which is laying down a platform 
for networking between Japanese and local SMEs in Singapore (JETRO, 
2009). 
(3) The Nordic European Center was founded in 2000 and is surrounded by 
enterprises from the Nordic European countries. The aim is not only to lower 
the start up costs for those enterprises but also to help them to expand from 
Singapore into other Asian countries.   
 
5 Entry Modes for Western Companies in Singapore 
5.1 Singaporean People 
Independent on the chosen entry mode doing business comes always 
together with dealing with people. Leading people in Singapore should 
consider the following in order to build up an effective management style. 
Although Singapore is a Chinese society, Singaporeans discover values of 
individualism since their economy is strongly linked to the West. In order to 
compensate the absence of natural resources, Singaporeans start to realize 
the need to continuously knowledge development, because skilled labor 
belongs to the factor conditions and is necessary to deal with global 
competitiveness (Porter, 1990:5). Today, Singapore can rely on this special 
diamond due to a highly skilled workforce and an excellent educational 
system for the next generation (Singapore Country Profile, 2007:16). Many 
Singaporean leaders believe in a heroic and dominating way to treat their 
employees for efficient performance. Driven by the pressure to succeed, 
Singaporeans have a strong fear to fail and subsequently, they avoid 
experimenting.  Western managers would appreciate their employees to be 
more proactive because they tend to avoid risk and have become 
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accustomed to highly directive control, because committing mistakes is 
regarded as highly costly (Leung and White 2004:381). 
5.2 Overview of entry modes to Singapore 
Once a company decides to target a particular country, it has to determine 
the best mode of entry. Each succeeding strategy involves more commitment, 
risk, control, and profit potential (Kotler, 2003).  
 
5.3 FDI in Singapore  
Singapore and the United States belong to the most open countries 
regarding foreign investment (Shujiro and Sasuya, 2007:22). As a matter of 
fact, Singapore holds an “open door” policy concerning foreign investment, 
which should attract FDI because the Singapore government does not intend 
to raise restrictions towards foreign investors (Hall, 1984:136). 100% foreign 
ownership for MNCs is allowed. Exceptions are only for the production of 
arms and ammunition, water, electricity, gas and telecommunication service 
(El Kahal, 2001:227). Figure 1-3 has already shown that Singapore is one of 
the four highest FDI recipients worldwide with an amount of 20.1 billion USD 
in 2005. Therefore this entry mode is very attractive for foreign companies 
investing into Singapore. This high amount of FDI inflow has also an impact 
on the export competiveness of this country. Indeed, Singapore and Hong 
Kong are the only two countries (regarding Hong Kong as an own state for 
this assumption) whose exports surpass their GDP (Zweig, 2002:100). The 
determining factor for this export growth can be found in the minimal 
restrictive trade policy pursued by the government in Singapore which leads 
to the fact that a large contribution of FDI is running into the export sector 
(Tongzon, 1998:148). 
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5.4 Joint Ventures in Singapore 
5.4.1 Definition of Joint Ventures 
The literature holds many definitions of Joint Ventures (JVs). While Friedman 
and Kalmanoff define JV as: “In the widest sense, the joint venture comprises 
any form of association which implies collaboration for more than a very 
transitory period. It excludes pure trading operations” (Friedmann, 1961:6) 
Robinson (1964:147) supports this definition and puts emphasis on the 
continuing relationship between the joint venture partners and the shared risk. 
Hall defines JV like this: “Broadly, a joint venture could be any arrangement 
by which two or more parties come together and combine resources to 
accomplish a specific commercial purpose for gain (Hall, 1984:19).” The 
author will stick to this definition: An (international) joint venture is a separate 
entity created by two or more active companies (of different nationalities) as 
sponsors.  
 
5.4.2 Reason for Joint Ventures 
Peter Killing identifies four basic purposes for establishing international joint 
ventures. The first is to strengthen the firm's existing business, the second is 
to take existing products into new markets, the third is to obtain new products 
which can be sold in the firm's existing markets, the fourth is to diversify into 
a new business (Killing, 1982). Joint Ventures are often used to enter foreign 
markets, which are available for companies with less funds, technology or 
human capital (Hall, 1984:1). So for those companies, who are facing the 
above mentioned problems can make use of JV to enter Singapore. So with 
JVs it is possible for the partners to pool resources and coordinate their 
efforts to achieve results that neither could obtain acting alone. Furthermore 
it is a popular approach to sharing development and production costs and 
penetrating new markets. 
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5.4.3 Formation of a Joint Venture in Singapore 
The worldwide number of established JV has been increasing in the last 
decade, but the same increase is shown by the dissatisfaction rate of JVs 
between Western and East Asian firms (Wang et al., 2005:17). Forming a JV 
in Singapore should consider the following: 
(A) According to Morris et al. there are two common misunderstandings in 
JVs between East Asian and Western companies. On the one hand, Western 
managers tend to ignore the objections indirectly expressed by the East 
Asian partners, whereas Asian managers might mistake the direct 
adversarial argument of the Western partners. If each party does understand 
what the other party is expecting at each stage of the conflict process an 
easier handling of these cross cultural problems can be assured (Morris et al., 
1998:730). 
(B) Foreign investors do have an advantage over their competitors by 
knowing and factoring Guanxi into their business decision (Luo and Chen, 
1997:14). Regarding the three life-cycle stages of JVs (Kogut, 1988:39, 
namely: Creation, Institutionalization and Termination, the question arises 
when Guanxi is applicable. Finding the right partner for a JV in Singapore 
takes place during the first stage: the creation stage. At this time, the use of 
Guanxi can help to succeed in Singapore. 
 
 
5.5 Licensing 
5.5.1 Definition of Licensing 
A contractual agreement between two parties sets the basis for this entry 
mode. Licensing is the business of leasing the right to use a legally protected 
name, graphic, logo, saying or likeness in conjunction with a product, 
promotion, or service (Czinkota, 1999:420). The owner of the property is 
known as the licensor and the renter of the rights is called the licensee who is 
usually a manufacturer. With this formal permission the licensee is allowed to 
use the licensor’s property according to the conditions of the agreement 
(Raugust, 1995:116). From the realized profits the licensee is paying the 
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royalty to the licensor. Additionally, a minimum amount of royalty, the 
guarantee, is paid in advance to the licensor and is independent on the 
revenue from the licensee’s sold products (Raugust, 1995:3).  Figure 5-1 
shows the relationship between these two parties in the license agreement. 
 
Figure 5-1 Relation between Licensor and Licensee 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
5.5.2 Reason for Licensing in Singapore 
Today, internationalization through licensing is one most modes to enter 
foreign markets. Therefore many firms are keen on building up a famous 
brand to preserve recognition by the costumers and to differ themselves from 
their competitors. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, the small 
domestic market size of Singapore limits a wide expansion within the country 
(The Economist Intelligent Unit, 2009). Therefore this entry mode, except for 
franchising, is not as common among the foreign companies as in other 
countries. But since the amounts of knowledge-based enterprises are 
increasing, the commercialization of intellectual property is becoming more 
and more popular. The attractiveness of this entry mode can be found in the 
extent of intellectual property of the target country. Software companies 
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usually use licensing to sell their products abroad. But nowadays software 
piracy points out a huge problem in this industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Software piracy in Asia/ Pacific, 2007 
 
 
Source: BSA and IDC 2007:10, Table 3 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the relation of pirated software to the used software in 
each country. Over 80% of the used software has not been legally acquired 
in countries like Pakistan, Indonesia, China or Vietnam. Although the central 
government e.g. in China has taken strong steps to fight software piracy, but 
the process to create an environment with a low piracy rate will take a long 
time. (BSA and IDC, 2006:3). The low piracy rate in Singapore with only 37% 
is one proof for a better intellectual property right system compared to the 
other countries of the Asia Pacific region.  
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Figure 5-3 Top 20 Patent Offices 2006 
 
Source: WIPO Patent Report 2008:7, Figure B.2 
 
Another proof for a good environment in Singapore shows figure 5-3, which is 
listing up the top 20 patent offices worldwide in regard with the total number 
of patent filling in 2006.  While Japan, USA and Chine states that a minimum 
of 50% of all patent applications were filled by resident, Singapore belongs to 
the minority of countries, where only non residents have filled out patent 
applications. The Intellectual Property Office of Singapore is in charge of 
administration of the intellectual property laws and was founded in 2001. 
Singapore's overall good protection of intellectual property (IP) has been 
improved further under the free-trade agreement (FTA) which was signed 
with the United States in May 2003. In January 2005 important changes to 
local IP laws and harder penalties for copyright infringement were 
implemented, e.g. fines up to 100.000 SGD or imprisonment up to five years 
(See Table 9-1 in the Appendix for further details). Summing up, licensing is 
a very attractive entry mode for Singapore since so many patents have been 
applied from non residents and intellectual property rights are respected in 
Singapore; therefore foreign investors are willing to share their knowledge 
through this entry mode with local partners.  
 
5.5.3 Definition of Franchising 
Franchising is a special form of licensing in which the franchiser makes an 
entire marketing program accessible to the franchisee. This program does 
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not only contain the brand name, logo and products, but also technique of 
business operation (Gillespie, 2004:235). For example, Burger King 
Hamburgers are following strict order given by Burger King Corporation 
concerning ingredients, taste and packaging. “The franchisee must comply 
with all specifications as to uniformity and quality of product preparation, 
service formats and standards of clean line” (Burger King 2007). 
 
5.5.4 Franchising in Singapore 
In order to form a franchise body of Singapore the Franchising & Licensing 
Association Singapore (FLA) was founded in 1993.  Its mission is to support 
Singapore franchise industry by forming Singapore a franchise hub, which 
leads to more franchise concepts coming from abroad in Singapore (FLA, 
2007). The Singapore Trade Board Development (TDB) represents another 
franchising promoting entity and supports franchise business concepts by 
offering help in form of legal services, subsidies and tax reliefs. The 
Singapore Productivity and Standards Board (PSB) founded in 1996 
(National Library, 2009) aims to create new opportunities and incentives to 
enhance an overall growth of the franchise industry. Today, the Franchising 
business has been well established in Singapore and can refer to many 
brands. There are more than 380 franchise concepts and over 3000 
franchise outlets in Singapore. Among these over 50% are coming from 
foreign brands. By looking at the type of industry where franchising has been 
used to succeed in Singapore, a significant market segment is the food 
service sector (Scott, 2007:20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 43
 
Figure 5-4 Franchise Market Segments in Singapore 2006 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from US Embassy 2006 
 
Figure 5-5 describes the different franchise segments in Singapore and 
reveals the popularity of franchise concepts coming from the food service 
with 40%. Education makes up the second largest market segment in 
Singapore with 30%, e.g. Berlitz or Cambridge Child Development (Liang, 
1999). Franchising in the service center is ranked on the third place with 20%.  
 
5.6 Wholly Owned Subsidiary (WOS) in Singapore  
A wholly owned subsidiary is a separate legal entity located in the host 
country and is owned by a holding company. The ownership can differ 
between 50.1% and up to 100%. A WOS does not always have to contain the 
entire value-added chain but its purpose can also strive for production, sales 
or financing needs (Schmid, 2006:16). As mentioned in chapter 1.1 the 
amount of WOS in Singapore came to 14,502 in 2002 (World Investment 
Report, 2006:271). This high amount of WOS proves the following: (1) the 
open door policy of the government of Singapore makes this country 
favorable for this entry mode. (2) A WOS in Singapore does not only relocate 
the presence of MNCs to Singapore but also allows them to operate from 
Singapore into more Asian countries. International investments banks, 
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accountancy and consulting firms do have regional headquarter in Singapore 
and conduct from Singapore their business in India (CII, 2007). A view on 
China shows the comparison: Since foreign companies tend to rely on strong 
managerial control, it explains the high amount of wholly foreign-owned 
enterprises (WFOEs) in China, namely over 7000 WFOEs in China. This 
explains the popularity of this investment vehicle for FDI because it makes up 
43% of the total FDI. On the other hand only 5000 equity joint ventures have 
been approved in China in 1997(Luo, 2001:172). 
 
 
5.7 Acquisitions in Singapore 
One way of expansion is to find in acquisitions, which are fast methods to 
obtain knowledge from other organizations without facing long development 
processes (Parch, Candy and Ellis, 2005). MNCs can gain unique resources 
from target organization through a acquisition (Chua and Go, 2009:79) 
“Acquisitions play an important role in the trading sector in Singapore, 
therefore private foreign investment has been the main force behind 
Singapore's rapid development over the past 30 years," reports the 
Economist Intelligence Unit. The investment laws in Singapore have been 
issued friendly for new businesses, especially for foreign businesses, since 
they are treated just like local businesses.  Previous restrictions in Singapore 
have been successively lifted, e.g. in the telecommunication sector the 49% 
foreign shareholding removed by the Telecommunication Authority of 
Singapore (TAS) in 1999 (Internet News, 1999). In 2002 trading restrictions 
on stockbrokers owned by foreigners were removed (USDS2, 2009). Figure 
5-5 summarizes the M&A deals in Singapore in the years 2004 and 2005. On 
the one hand, with a volume growth rate of 18% (from 440 to 517) and an 
increase of the volume of 27% (from 19.7 billion to 25 billion USD) the 
implication of a recovery on deal sizes in Singapore is given.  
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Figure 5-5 Summary of 2005 & 2004 M&A deals 
 
 
Own Illustration, Source: Corporate Finance Reports,  
The Singapore Mergers & Acquisitions Bulletin, 2006:2, Figure 1 
 
On the other hand, a look at the breakdown of cross-border and local deals in 
Figure 5-6 explains the globalizing trend of Singapore. Although 92 inbound 
acquisitions (a domestic firm is acquired by a foreign firm) seem to be small 
compared to the 231 outbound acquisitions. The growth rate of foreign buy-
outs with 21% exceeds the local buy-outs increase with only 16% foreign 
investors are therefore willing to increase their share in the local business or 
even to take over, because they are confident in the economic prospects of 
Singapore. 
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Figure 5-6 Breakdown of cross-border and local deals 
 
Source: Corporate Finance Reports,  
The Singapore Mergers & Acquisitions Bulletin 2006:2, Figure 2 
 
 
 
6 Case Study: TRUMPF in Singapore 
6.1 Introduction of the case study 
This case study shows the entry strategy of TRUMPF to the Asia Pacific 
region, which is a Germany base company that specialized in manufacturing 
technology. 
6.1.1 Purpose of the TRUMPF case 
The aim is to reflect the theoretical framework of internationalizing in 
TRUMPF’s process of expanding to Singapore with the focus on culture 
differences and the effect on the chosen entry mode respectively. The 
analysis reveals the strong ethnocentric German culture of this organization, 
which plays a distinctive role of surviving in Asia and deals with the rising 
manufacturing industry in China. This case study analyzes the implications 
this culture brings along in an international business setting with the focus on 
Asia as some of the most significant emerging markets of the industry can be 
found here. TRUMPF encounters many critical issues while operating in 
Singapore, but the greatest fear of TRUMPF is a Chinese competitor copying 
TRUMPF’s products and offering them to a cheaper price. This hypothetical 
situation could shortly become reality according to the report by KPMG 
(2004). Several problems with regards to starting up in China are discussed, 
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but the key issue remains that TRUMPF will be forced to work together with 
other Chinese firms in order to maintain its leadership in the market.  
TRUMPF seems to be interested in low-end industry, since this segment is 
willing to move up the value chain to increase its profit margins. The reason 
that Singapore was chosen to be the regional HQ for the Asia-Pacific 
competence center for this business coordination will be become clear after 
this case study. 
6.1.2 Methodology of the TRUMPF case 
 
The data for this project is mainly collected from personal interviews with the 
TRUMPF management in Singapore.  In addition, the communication with 
lower level employees is added to provide different viewpoints for the case 
study. On top of the company releases and primarily annual reports, 
secondary literature is used to build an understanding of the steel industry 
and market. This background knowledge is needed to analyze and reflect on 
future business implications.  
 
6.1.3 Limitations of the TRUMPF case 
This analysis only focuses on TRUMPF headquarter located in Germany and 
its relationship with its Asian markets, although there are also essential 
differences between the within the European and North American markets. 
The communication with representatives in Singapore was limited due to 
internal control mechanisms with reference to internal politics. The scope of 
the master thesis did not cover analysis of the American and Japanese 
markets, but comparison with these would improve the understanding of the 
conflicts the strong German corporate culture implies. 
6.2 Facts and Figures of TRUMPF 
TRUMPF is a German leading company in production technology, founded in 
1923 by Christian Trumpf, it has an average annual sales of 1,34 billion € 
and 7.928 employees worldwide in 2009/10 (TRUMPF, 2010:2). The four 
business fields of TRUMPF are: 
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 Machine Tools  
 Power Tools  
 Laser Technology  and Electronics  
 Medical Technology  
Machine and power tools divisions are the core business of TRUMPF and 
make up more than 66,2% of total sales (Trumpf 2010:31). These machines 
provide crucial services in the manufacturing industry and can process sheet 
metal, perform metal punching, forming and bending. Laser technology is 
another prospective industry, serving important applications such as the 
cutting and welding of metal. This division together with Electronics makes up 
24,3% of the sales. Medical Technology represents the remaining 9,5% of 
total sales and is also a growing business area. TRUMPF has a wide global 
presence, covering the European, North American, and Asian markets with 
59 subsidiaries (TRUMPF, 2010:25). Figure 6-1 shows the sales by region in 
2009/10 and it is clear that 63,2% of TRUMPF’s total sales are from both 
Germany and other European countries. 
 
Figure 6-1 Sales of TRUMPF by Region in 2009/10 (in million €) 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, data obtained from TRUMPF, 2010:32 
 
Europe has always been regarded as the largest market for machine tools, 
with Germany being the biggest machine tools market by tradition. But China 
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overtook Germany and became the world’s largest market in 2002 (KMPG, 
2004:8) due to the rapid growth in the Chinese manufacturing sector. As 
China is the single largest manufacturing market in the world it will be 
interesting to see the changes in the laser technology. The study of Frost 
&Sullivan (2005) has determined a global market share of 65.7% held by 
North America and Europe, while Japan and Asia-Pacific have been sharing 
the rest of 34.3%. This relation is likely to change in the long run, since Asia 
is becoming more important for this industry. 
 
6.3 TRUMPF’s position in the world 
The machine tools and laser technology markets have not yet been strongly 
influenced by global competition rising in Asia. In general, few giant 
companies situated in USA (e.g. Cummins, Schuler), Europe (e.g. AGIA, 
DMG, Siemens) and Japan (Makino, Yamazaki) are dominating the global 
market. The German family owned manufacturer TRUMPF belongs to one of 
the big companies. This thesis aims at the strong corporate culture of 
TRUMPF, reflecting its German heritage. It also discusses the implication of 
the firm’s culture and observes whether this culture can fit the international 
business setting especially in Asia, where some of the most significant 
emerging markets of the industry are located. TRUMPF’s current market 
strategy for Asia contains setting up subsidiaries in Singapore, Japan, Korea 
and China.  
The important development for TRUMPF is the change of the top 
management. On the 18th of November 2005, Professor Berthold Leibinger 
passed his position as chairman to Dr. Nicola Leibinger-Kammüller after 
leading the TRUMPF for four decades. The new president can rely on three 
years of Asian experience through running the Japanese subsidiary of 
TRUMPF. It will be interesting to see the next generation contributing with 
new perspectives and dealing with the traditional family owned company 
culture. As the first major management shift in the history of the company, 
TRUMPF’s strategy and view on international business are expected to 
change.  
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6.4 The Asian Market of TRUMPF 
 
The Chinese machine tool market is not only rapidly growing in regard on the 
expanding manufacturing industry, but also the world’s biggest when sales 
reached US $ 5,7 billion in 2002. Within the top ten machine tools market, the 
Chinese market was also the only growth market. Due to domestic expansion 
within China and foreign investments into China, KPMG (2004:11) calculated 
approximately that the Chinese machine tool consumption grew at an annual 
growth rate of 15 percent and is likely to grow through in 2005, reaching an 
estimated sales value of US$7 billion. In order to stay competitive in the 
world market by producing quality products, Chinese manufacturers are in 
need of quality machines. Foreign manufacturers are coming to China 
because of its low manufacturing costs. Nevertheless, they must maintain the 
same quality product and therefore they must bring along the same 
production equipment into China.  
The machine tools market in China contains three markets: low-end, middle, 
and high-end. Small domestic firms posses the low-end market and starting 
to move into the mid-range market, which was traditionally in control of 
Taiwanese and Korean manufacturers throughout cooperative production 
with foreign manufacturers  and joint ventures.  However, the high-end 
market is run by foreign machine tools manufactures from Japan, the United 
States, Germany, and other European nations. Their unique selling 
proposition (USP) lies in their qualitative machines with advanced “precision, 
speed, reliability, and ease of maintenance.” Therefore, they can charge a 
price premium for their machines and still be able to hold their market share. 
The largest buyers of machine tools come from the automotive, aerospace 
and military sectors.  The automotive sector makes 50% of the total 
consumption in 2001 (CMTBA, 2002). This industry together with the 
aerospace industry is very important for the high-end machine tools 
manufacture because they have a need of “special purpose precision 
machine tools” (KPMG, 2004:12). These industries are expected to keep 
growing into the future.  The Chinese automotive industry was the seventh 
largest market for the sale of cars and is projected to reach the third rank by 
2010 (KPMG, 2004:12).  The aerospace industry is growing faster thanks to 
 
 
 51
the increasing demand for air travel in China.  In 2020, the number of 
commercial aircrafts will be four times larger than today. Additionally, many 
aerospace companies have repositioned their repair, maintenance, and parts 
production to China. The growth in these markets will increase the demand 
for more high-end machine tools.  
 
6.5 The TRUMPF Subsidiary in Singapore 
TRUMPF Singapore has been registered as a private limited company with 
the number 199106396H under the Singapore Business Registration Act at 
Accounting & Corporate Regulatory Authority (ACRA). This subsidiary is 100% 
owned by the German holding company in order to preserve the strong 
German corporate structure and thereby the strict control over this office. 
Working areas are asked to be kept clean and well organized. To attain high 
quality standards, the employees are provided with top-of-the-line laptops 
and stationary. The background influence of the German culture also ingrains 
a form of family business mentality within the employees inviting them to 
think in terms of long term profits, believing that fewer barriers to change 
creates a culture that supports innovation.  
TRUMPF Singapore is located in the German Center of Singapore in Jurong 
East. This advantage is crucial in terms of dealing with the Asian culture and 
in terms of the Guanxi factor because the German Center is an ideal place 
for TRUMPF to exchange new local news and build up new relationships with 
other German companies, in the first place. In addition to that, Asian 
customers, who have relationships with TRUMPF, can easily take on the 
advantage of retrieving new contacts of other German firms. TRUMPF 
considers Singapore as its South-East Pacific regional headquarter, due to 
its strategic location, political stability, financial situation and strong legal 
system. 
 
6.6 Organization Architecture of TRUMPF  
TRUMPF will be analyzed at four key subjects: culture, controls, processes 
and finally people (see Figure 6-3). 
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6.6.1 Culture of TRUMPF  
TRUMPF, as a German based company, has a typically German business 
culture. The people here are very harsh especially with the use of the titles. It 
is crucial to know the exact position of other employees and normal to use 
this information in the daily communication. “Quality over costs” is the key 
message of this corporate culture. They are willing to accept substantial 
increases in costs, if it allows them to improve their products. This is reflected 
in the culture as employees are proud of promoting the high quality 
products.13 However, a very strong belief to prevail in the future is shown 
because the employees do not see any firm in China being able to duplicate 
their products within the next five years. Nevertheless, the strong culture 
(ethnocentric) certainly has a down-side as it can be less willing to spot new 
trends. A strict policy makes clear that the choice of placing high-end R&D 
had to be Germany and Switzerland and not Asia. 
 
Figure 6-2 The Four Key Subjects of TRUMPF 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
6.6.2 Controls and Structure of TRUMPF’ subsidiaries 
TRUMPF’s regional offices are lead by the general managers and product 
managers. The subsidiaries are in control of one or two managerial positions 
                                                 
13 Personal communication GM 
 
 
 53
covering sales, services, and support. Concerning the subsidiaries, 
subsidiary reports from the regional offices are sent directly to the German 
top management. Uwe Vogel is the general manager of the subsidiary in 
Singapore. TRUMPF management is watching the operations of the 
organization very closely. The database records every service activity, e.g. a 
breakdown of a machine.14 The TRUMPF companies at its regional level 
have to submit yearly plans to the German headquarters, who will then 
announce which decisions to be carried out concerning new sales targets, 
marketing strategies and other performance indicators. 
All computer stations are secured with a personal login and the configuration 
of the operating system only allows work-related assignments. A more 
general philosophy indicates that employees should differentiate between 
private and activities. Therefore, programs like instant messaging, game 
related programs and social network websites are blocked, unless the 
business need is given. 
 
6.6.3 Processes of TRUMPF 
The SYNCHRO process refers to a systematic method of identifying and 
eliminating waste. The principle of SYNCHRO lies on three pillars, which 
includes (1) just-in-time production to prevent overproduction, (2) 
manufacturing high quality products by using safe work processes and (3) 
incorporation of creativity and knowledge in the employees of TRUMPF. The 
supply chain management software is able to summarize the whole process, 
so that TRUMPF can efficiently monitor overall quality in the production 
process. Despite the fact that the influence of SYNCHRO is not simply limited 
to the production because its focus on efficiency is a quality pertinent to the 
entire process starting from product development until the line to sales.  
6.6.4 People of TRUMPF 
The employees of TRUMPF are the key elements in this entire structure. It 
comes clear that the employee’s relationship to Germany is important. All 
employees with higher positions are sent to the HQ in Germany for 
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management training. Staffing policy strictly calls for ability to comply with 
German values and culture, e.g. punctuality, precision and quality. The 
ethnocentric approach allows the subsidiaries and the headquarters in 
Germany to communicate easily; but on the other hand, the “German 
prospective” holds a prevailing opinion in all subsidiaries. This implies that 
the willingness to attempt new alliances in e.g. Asia does practically not exist, 
hence a corporate culture with very little interaction with local environment. 
Moreover, the control mechanisms, for example, keeping private activities 
away from work may only be accepted in Germany, yet for the Singaporean, 
this restriction hinders their ability to “think out of the box”. The subsidiaries of 
TRUMPF add value in terms of distribution, service, and support, but not 
R&D.   
6.7 Subsidiary Strategies in Singapore 
 
The Singaporean office is divided into two divisions; one division focuses on 
the Singaporean market and the other division (TRUMPF Asia Pacific) 
focuses on the Asia-Pacific region, excluding the countries which have their 
own offices. The analysis will take a close look at the subsidiary strategy 
utilized in Singapore, as this location is seen as the hub of the Southeast 
Asian region. 
6.7.1 Product and Market Scope 
Figure 6-4 shows TRUMPF’s position on the product and market scope.  The 
market scope measures the number and extent of geographic markets a 
subsidiary or firm is facing while the product scope is the measure of the 
influence a subsidiary has over its own product offers. Before analyzing the 
subsidiary’s market scope, it is crucial to analyze TRUMPF’s market scope 
as a whole. TRUMPF Asia-Pacific has the general goal of “growing the 
business” in the Asia-Pacific region.15The different subsidiaries throughout 
Asia and the rest of the world reflect an attempt to extend the market scope 
outside the important European and North American markets. This move 
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preserves the company’s future with this foundation in the Asian markets, 
which contain the fastest-growing markets for most of their products.   
 
Figure 6-3 Product and Market Scope of TRUMPF 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
TRUMPF Asia Pacific’s market scope is as wide as its customer base. 
Service technicians are generally spread throughout South-East Asia. In 
terms of product scope, the subsidiary aims to be a sales office and training 
center. Its purpose are three value-adding functions: (a) providing information 
on products and services to possible new customers and allows to the 
existing customers to place customized orders, (b) acting as a hub for service 
technicians to be qualified and send regularly report and (c) securing the 
delivery of the product and ensuring after sales servicing and customer 
relations. The narrow product scope of the TRUMPF subsidiary in Singapore 
can be explained by the lack of influence over the offered products. As a 
sales office, its purpose is to fill orders, ensure delivery, and to offer after-
sales service. Customizations are only possible through the headquarters in 
Germany, which limits the local subsidiary’s ability to design new products. 
The narrow product scope and wide geographic scope of TRUMPF Asia 
Pacific identifies it as a product specialist of the region (See Figure 6-4).   
Obviously, Asian customers have much different perceived values than those 
in Europe and North America, where TRUMPF is already holding a strong 
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position.  For example, the power tools market in Asia has been unsuccessful 
because of the lack of demand for high quality power tools. Most of the 
power tools customers in Asia are identified as small companies and 
individuals who prefer price advantages rather than quality advantages, 
which is completely the opposite in Europe and North America16. As well 
known as a product specialist, TRUMPF has been only able to succeed in 
the machine tools and laser technology market due to the high-end nature of 
these products.  
 
6.7.2 Knowledge Flows in TRUMPF Company 
The role of TRUMPF Asia Pacific is identified as an implementer according to 
the knowledge flow structure between the HQ in Germany and the subsidiary. 
Figure 6-5 shows low knowledge flows from the subsidiary to headquarters 
and high knowledge flows from headquarters to the subsidiary.  
Headquarters gives out the product offerings, and constantly controls 
TRUMPF Asia Pacific. The subsidiary relies heavily on knowledge 
disseminated from headquarters. As an implementer, valuable feedback 
about the details of the Singaporean market is unseen. Only one engineer 
from TRUMPF Asia-Pacific is in the development board in Germany. This 
may not be sufficient for all of Southeast Asia, which is developing at a rapid 
rate. It has already been expected that product scope should be increased in 
order to provide a more well-rounded service for the Asian market. This 
increase has to go along with a parallel increase in the knowledge flow from 
the subsidiary to headquarters, at the same time. 
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Figure 6-4 Knowledge Flow in TRUMPF 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
6.7.3 Strategic Emphasis of TRUMPF in Singapore 
The aim of the subsidiary in Singapore is in harmony with the overall 
company strategy of TRUMPF, which is to emphasize high quality, 
customized products and service. The goal is clearly to give the product a 
high value. The competitive scope is broad because TRUMPF competes on 
two fronts. They try to differentiate on product innovation through R&D as 
well as provide quality after-sales service. The Stan Shih’s Smiling Curve can 
illustrate this strategy as this model is helpful to determine how a company 
can add supplementary value to its products (Barlett, and Ghoshal, 
2000:136).  This curve was invented by the former CEO of ACER Stan Shih 
and showed how ACER could stay competitive in the international market. In 
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Stan Shih’s smiling curve for TRUMPF, the management is trying to compete 
on both ends of the model for maximum total value (See Figure 6-6).  
 
Figure 6-5 Stan Shih's Smiling Curve for TRUMPF 
Value Chain Analysis 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
TRUMPF scores with its software, which allows realistic tests and provides 
quality assurance of the products. The “One hand” feature of TRUMPF refers 
to the interconnection of the machines. Basically, only one hand is needed to 
give out the instructions from the monitor to the machines for, e.g. bending, 
or cutting. On the other side, the subsidiary’s role is to carry out the after-
sales service segment of the differentiation.   
This may become a problem, when they enter the China machine tools 
market. For example, TRUMPF will deal with increased competition from 
domestic and other foreign competitors. Key findings from the KPMG China 
Machine Tools report indicate that the machine tool is a fast-developing 
industry, and the quality level of Chinese-made products is constantly rising. 
This reduces the competitive advantage of TRUMPF, which so far has been 
the differentiation through product quality.  In addition to the competitive 
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advantage, after-sales service is also becoming less of a differentiator as 
local manufacturers rapidly increase their service quality.  Western 
companies still dominate the mid to high-range end of the machine tools 
market in China, but some leading domestic manufacturers are starting to 
compete with improved machines. TRUMPF should have to consider 
differentiating on additional parts of the value chain in order to maintain its 
competitive advantage. 
TRUMPF Asia-Pacific is given the order to “grow the business” in the Asia-
Pacific region. The physical presence in Singapore has been the first step to 
the expansion to Asia. 17  The various subsidiaries throughout Asia and the 
rest of the world reflect a try to widen the market scope besides the important 
European and North American markets. To preserve the future of TRUMPF, 
new projects were assigned to set a foundation in the Asian markets, which 
contains the fastest-growing markets for many of their products. The time is 
right for this business decision, since China has now overtaken Germany as 
the largest machine tools market in the world, for instance. 
 
6.7.4 Alliances of TRUMPF 
There is no interest into working with foreign or domestic partners because 
TRUMPF highly prefers internal R&D, own service and support processes. 
Instead of setting up R&D subsidiaries in Asia, TRUMPF has centralized 
R&D mainly in Germany and Switzerland. The Asian subsidiaries provide 
only low-end production (accounting of less than 10% of total group revenues) 
and focus on more importantly activities, e.g. sales and service, to support 
the high-end products coming from Europe. 
Since the technology of TRUMPF is the key to their success, TRUMPF does 
not intend to share this knowledge with other competitors, of course. 
Although, the use of JVs as entry mode could help TRUMPF in gaining 
profound knowledge in local markets, TRUMPF prefers to set up WOS for 
market penetration moves. This corporate strategy of TRUMPF helps to 
protect the intellectual property of this company. But  JVs are used as the 
most common entry mode for China in this industry, while the parent 
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company is able to maintain a high degree of control and still benefiting from 
the knowledge of locals (KPMG 2004:31).  
As an example for this, TRUMPF joined together with the Swiss firm 
SiberHegner, a leading marketing and services group. The cooperation, 
which existed since 1995, resulted in a joint-venture entering China in July 
2002. The aim was to combine TRUMPF’s products with SiberHegner’s 
experiences with the market. More than 20 distribution agencies, service, and 
application centers where initiated by this alliance to respond to the rapidly 
growing Chinese market. TRUMPF’s alliance with SiberHegner comes with 
three advantages: (a) facilitating the entry into the Chinese market, (b) 
benefitting from SiberHegner’s proficiency in market intelligence and local 
expertise and finally (c) a strong market penetration. Although, sharing sales 
channel may be useful but the potential of the local economy for R&D and 
production has not been revealed. Furthermore, this Joint Venture in China 
between these two European companies does not evaluate to hire Chinese 
managers, which could contribute with deeper knowledge of the local market 
and the Asian culture in order to improve efficiency of the company. 
As TRUMPF has changed its top management in Germany and passed the 
control to the former CEO for three years of the Japanese TRUMPF 
subsidiary Dr. Nicola Leibinger-Kammüller, TRUMPF will set a new direction 
towards more alliances with Asian firms. 
 
6.7.5 Strategic Fit of TRUMPF 
An evaluation of the match between organization, operations and the market 
conditions needs to consider the change of the market conditions at any time. 
This case study will both analyze the match with current and likely future 
market. Figure 6-7 illustrates the Strategic FIT of TRUMPF. Organization 
supports strategy & Operations and Operations support strategy. The 
strategic situation from the perspective of the regional office in Singapore and 
the HQ in Germany are reflected in the market. The German headquarters 
are following a strategy based on high end products and services. Referring 
to the previous conducted value chain analysis (See Figure 6-6) it is clear 
that TRUMPF succeeds in both areas. The company philosophy demands 
 
 
 61
quality rather than quality to costs. In fact, TRUMPF will firstly keep on 
delivering state of the art products and services and secondarily look for 
cutting costs processes. 
 
 
Figure 6-6 Strategic Fit of TRUMPF 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
In order to implement this strategy TRUMPF has placed R&D in Switzerland 
and put Germans into all managerial positions throughout Asia, although the 
rates for Asian salaries are significant lower.  
According to the interviews18, the Singaporean office obviously follows all 
rules from Germany, e.g. product development is meant to be so crucial that 
it is to be handled in Germany. These rules also apply for all sorts of 
marketing material which cannot be given out to local agencies. 19  Local 
presence is, nevertheless, required for service and support to maintain a 
good relationship with Singaporean customers. There is a market demand for 
high end products including service and support, e.g. the auto and plane 
industries. The price sensitivity of high end products in Europe and USA is 
lower, whereas a manager in Asia is more price sensitive. However, the 
strategic fit of TRUMPF seems to exist in Singaporean market. Nevertheless, 
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over the last few years the Chinese market has seen a fast development. 
Low end producers intend to get involved to the new technologies, so that 
they can move up the value curve (KPMG, 2004:23). It is very likely that 
TRUMPF will soon get a competitor offering same products, same quality, 
and same level of service/support, but at significantly lower cost. This new 
situation will force TRUMPF to consider a change of strategy in order to stay 
competitive in the Asian market.  
 
6.8  New Challenges for TRUMPF in Asia 
What the project has not dealt with so far is the significant lack of intellectual 
property (IP) rights in China compared to Singapore, which so far has been 
the primary reason for TRUMPF not to setting up manufacturing plants 
there. 20  According to TRUMPF, Chinese competitors do not have the 
knowledge to get close to TRUMPF R&D or manufacturing technology. 
Hypothetically, the management of TRUMPF does consider the possibility of 
this thread, but more efforts need to be done in terms of strategic planning of 
the China case. In addition, the cultural differences between Germany and 
China may also cause different conflicts. 
Although the Chinese market consists of a large number of low level 
producers, they have to find a way to add value to their production in order to 
get a bit away from the strong price competition (KPMG, 2004). One key 
issue is obvious which management has not yet dealt with: If a Chinese 
competitor replicates TRUMPF products and sells the very same product 
under a different brand but cheaper. This realistic scenario should be briefly 
discussed by the TRUMPF management. Hence, it is very likely that a 
manufacturer will duplicate one or several of TRUMPF’s products. The 
resources, i.e. capital, knowledge, and production units are already present 
in China. 
Assuming the duplication scenario, TRUMPF will be able to rely on their 
brand as well as their significant better performance in customizing and 
distribution of their products at the beginning of the competition. Nevertheless, 
that competitive advantage will not hold in the long run. To understand the 
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situation, it is useful to consider the car industry, such as the large German 
brands such as BMW and Mercedes. These firms have moved to China not 
only to cost cutting reasons but also due to the research and development 
opportunities. 
In order to sustain in Asia, TRUMPF must collaborate and find technology 
partners who are able to provide R&D in the periphery areas.21 Additionally, 
though cost is not a major topic in TRUMPF, they still have to put cost cutting 
processes on the agenda. Not necessarily to match directly to the low level 
Chinese competitors, but at least to offer realistic products at reasonable 
prices  for price sensitive customers in Asia. 
Since there are many low level producers in China, TRUMPF should 
consider this as an opportunity to take proactive move in order to move up 
the value curve. Nevertheless, the strategy of TRUMPF “being the best” 
cannot always be realized, especially not in terms of all sorts of R&D. Since 
TRUMPF has a competitive advantage in the laser technology based on its 
unique knowledge, this division should be the core business for further 
implications. 
 
6.9 Conclusion of the TRUMPF case 
The purpose of this project was to analyze TRUMPF’s current subsidiary 
strategy in Asia Pacific and to evaluate future managerial implications of this. 
TRUMPF’s decision to choose WOS as the entry mode for Singapore was 
the basis for setting up a regional HQ for the South Pacific area and more 
importantly to ensure the control of the German parent company. As a tenant 
of the business offices of the German Center in Singapore, TRUMPF is 
coping with the Guanxi factor in Singapore. Building up strong relationship 
with other German firms to create their own network is a good approach the 
Chinese culture and attracts more Asian costumers to do business with 
TRUMPF.  Having the HQ region situated in Singapore refers to the strategic 
location of Singapore. The highly developed infrastructure and the political 
stable situation are underlying the attractiveness of Singapore, but most 
important for TRUMPF is the fact that Singapore is the hub not only for 
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transportation but also for the financial sector in Asia. Surrounded by this 
stable financial environment in Singapore TRUMPF has built up its strong 
position in South-East Asia. Though the ethnocentric approach (very strong 
German culture) seems to have a somewhat restricting effect on the working 
environment, TRUMPF is overall meeting current market conditions well. 
TRUMPF has been quite successful in driving their high-end products 
forward in a Business to Business (B2B) market which could be expected to 
be quite sensitive. TRUMPF’s market situation is likely to be challenged by 
indeed very qualified competitors from China. TRUMPF should make use of 
the collected experiences in Guanxi and the influence of Chinese culture in 
Singapore to target the Chinese market as the next business step in the long 
run.  With smaller R&D and manufacturing clusters TRUMPF should get 
started in the low end market of China. The choice of China lies in the fact, 
that it is the largest market within the industry and holds new opportunities for 
TRUMPF in growing their business in Asia. 
 
7 Conclusion 
7.1 Recommended Strategy to enter the Singaporean Market 
So far, this thesis has presented the market in Singapore concerning its 
challenges, risks and advantages for new businesses. The economic 
success arises from conventional comparative and competitive advantages 
(Low and Toh 1996:27). Nevertheless, there is no universal strategy for 
Western companies to enter the business market in Singapore. Choosing the 
best entry mode is complex and requires many considerations. The 
respective relevance of these considerations differs from industry and from 
the strategic goals of each firm. (Gillespie, Jeannet, Hennessey 2004:253). 
The Guanxi factor has been briefly discussed regarding the different entry 
strategy and it is clear how useful pulling Guanxi in Singapore can be for 
western firms. Networking is more important than information. “Who you 
know” has more value than “What you know” in Asia (Yeung and Tung, 1996). 
The chosen location of TRUMPF in the German Center of Singapore works 
 
 
 65
out just perfectly to connect with partners and helping out each other in this 
country. 
Table 7-1 summarizes the general characteristics of different entry modes. It 
is obvious that depending on the chosen entry mode the company is facing 
different advantages and disadvantages. The entry strategy is mostly 
influenced by the business environment. When property rights are secured, 
licensing is recommended and joint ventures are preferred for poorly 
protected property rights countries (Che and Fachhini, 2009:482).  
Singapore’s environment offers strong intellectual property rights but it was 
the right decision for TRUMPF to set up a WOS because in this technological 
industry knowledge is the key to success. With a WOS in Singapore 
TRUMPF has a lead in technology knowledge over the Asian competitors 
and can move from Singapore into new markets in Asia. 
 
 
Table 7-1 Characteristics of Different Entry Modes 2004 
Strategic 
Consideration 
Mode of entry 
Indirect 
Export 
Direct 
Export-
Marketing 
Subsidiary 
Licensing Wholly 
Owned 
Production 
Joint 
Venture 
Acquisition
Speed of Entry High High High Low Low High 
Ease of exit High Moderate Moderate Low Low Low 
Rapidly 
changing 
technologies 
Low High High Moderate Moderate Moderate 
Resource 
demands Low Moderate Moderate High High High 
Profit potential Low High Low High Moderate Moderate 
Competitive 
intensity of 
market 
Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
Integration into 
global network Low High Low High Low Moderate 
Strategically 
important 
country 
Low High Low High Moderate Moderate 
Unimportant 
Market  High Low Moderate Low Low Low 
Cultural 
Distance High Low Moderate  Low Moderate Low 
Congruence with 
host 
government’s 
goal 
Low Low Moderate High High Moderate 
Source: Gillespie, Kate, 2004:254, Table 9.3 
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7.2 Future Outlook of Western Companies in Singapore 
There is no doubt of China being the fastest growing market worldwide. But 
Singapore can score with its strategic location, high infrastructure and open 
mind towards foreign business ideas. FDI was always encouraged by the 
government which has led Singapore to an open economy towards foreign 
companies. Profitable business opportunities come along with high risk 
potential as well. The key to success lies in the process of “finding the right 
partner”. Growing with partners also means becoming a part of the Asian 
Family in Singapore.  Luo’s and Chen’s (1997) study also shows, either JV or 
WOS, the selection of an appropriate local partner is thus an essential way to 
adapt to the indigenous environment and achieve the benefits of Guanxi for 
entering a Chinese or Chinese dominated market.   
 
7.3 Locating in Asia 
Concentrating all business activities into one single location is risky and 
considering the rising currency and economic overheating forces companies 
to evaluate alternative locations for their businesses. Nowadays, it seems 
hard to neglect the fact that China holds attractive locations for many 
industries. China offers a strong microeconomic environment, especially for 
the manufacturing sector, but its overall macroeconomic environment should 
be regarded with caution. Table 7-2 shows an analysis of key resources 
needed for a range of industries. Considering these factors may help to see if 
the current preferred location may change in future, since the location 
decision is based on many firms, market and industry factors and influenced 
by resources (Singh, Delios, 2005:72). Singapore and Hong Kong, which are 
among the most conducive locations for high end financial services in Asia, 
have seen the departure of many firms in other industries because of high 
cost structures. But for these countries, the high cost of skilled human and 
other resources offsets their other advantage. 
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Table 7-2 Locating in Asia 
Industry Key Resources Current 
Options 
Emerging 
Options 
Automobile 
manufacturing 
 Supplier networks 
 Manufacturing & logistics 
infrastructure 
 Local demand 
 Japan 
 South Korea 
 Thailand 
 China 
 India 
Automobile 
components 
 Technical HR 
 Automobile assemblers 
 Japan 
 Taiwan 
 Thailand 
 China 
 India 
Biotechnology 
 Scientific HR 
 Intellectual property rights 
protection 
 University & private R&D 
 Japan 
 Australia 
 Singapore 
 South Korea 
 India 
Consumer 
electronics 
 Supplier networks 
 Low –cost HR 
 Japan 
 South Korea 
 Taiwan  
 China 
Education 
 Educational institutions 
 Hospitable environment 
 Extensive, quality HR 
 Australia 
 New Zealand 
 Malaysia  
 Singapore 
Electronic 
components 
(high-end) 
 Technical HR 
 Supplier networks 
 Manufacturing excellence 
 R&D infrastructure 
 Japan 
 Taiwan 
 South Korea 
 China 
Electronic 
components mid to 
low end) 
 Low-cost technical HR 
 Low cost manufacturing 
  
 Taiwan  
 Malaysia 
 Thailand 
 China 
 Vietnam 
Hard disk drives 
 Operations & technical HR 
 Manufacturing & logistics 
infrastructure 
 Singapore 
 Thailand 
 Malaysia 
 China 
IT-enables services  Technical HR  Telecommunications  India 
 Philippines 
 Malaysia 
Pharmaceuticals 
 Technical HR 
 Manufacturing excellence 
 R&D funding 
 IPR protection 
 Japan 
 Australia 
 Singapore 
 India 
 Thailand 
Regional HQs 
 Communications links 
 Hospitable environment 
 Low-cost structure 
 Singapore 
 Hong Kong 
 Sydney 
 Shanghai 
 Kuala Lumpur 
Shoes 
 Low cost HR 
 Low-cost materials, assembly, & 
transportation 
 Indonesia 
 Thailand 
 Vietnam 
 Bangladesh 
Telecoms hardware 
 Technical HR 
 Manufacturing excellence 
 Supplier networks 
 Japan 
 South Korea 
 Taiwan 
 China 
Telecoms software  Technical HR  Telecoms firms & users 
 Japan 
 South Korea 
 India 
 China 
Textiles & clothing 
 Low-cost HR 
 Low-cost manufacturing & 
materials 
 Malaysia 
 Indonesia 
 China 
 India 
 Sri Lanka 
 Vietnam 
Water fabrication 
plants 
 Scientific & technical HR 
 Low-cost land & utilities  
 R&D & technology 
 Taiwan 
 South Korea 
 Singapore 
 China 
Source: Singh, Delios, (2005:72) 
 
 
 
 68
With the rise of competition in South-East Asia some traditional 
manufacturing industries are repositioning elsewhere and some are staying 
and upgrading their products. Singapore has been lifting up the value chain 
to certain knowledge intensive business doings, e.g. pharmaceuticals. In 
order to continue to attract MNCs and FDI Singapore must focus on high end 
products and new technologies, since China scores with cheap production 
costs and low end products (ADO 2006:223). By looking at the natural 
resources, it is obvious that the 36th rank of Singapore cannot be the 
convincing key driver for an investment move to this small country (See 
Appendix 9-18 and 9-19). But taking to account that Singapore offers one of 
the best human resources (5th place) and enough capital resources (4th place 
worldwide), these facts explain the  high concentration of international 
business in Singapore (See Appendix 9- 20 until 9-23).  
 
7.4 New Challenges for MNC in Singapore   
Since Singapore is a resource-poor country and is dependent on Malaysia 
concerning water and food supply; however, Singapore holds a strong 
economy with significant growth in the past decade.  This environment was 
supported by the strategic location along international shipping, air routes, 
and high skilled human capital. Singapore as a business hub can offer 
strategic alliances to international companies, who intend to start in 
Singapore and look for a base from which they aim to launch and manage 
further investment projects not only in China but also in the Southeast Asia 
market. (Luo, 2000:63). TRUMPF was an excellent example for this business 
strategy.  
Since China entered the WTO (World Trade Organization) the problem for 
Singapore lies in its high cost base for manufacturing. Therefore, Singapore 
is changing from a manufacturing-based export hub into a knowledge based 
economy. With the help of the comparatively skilled labor force and 
advanced infrastructure, Singapore will become the center for financial, 
business and other high valued-added services.  (Singapore, 2005:20) 
New developments in the Asian region such as the WTO accession of 
Vietnam on the 11th of January 2007 will definitely open up new opportunities 
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for Western companies in Asia (WTO 2007). Having a Headquarter in 
Singapore holds a strategic advantage for entering Vietnam due to the 
geographical close distance to Singapore. As the 150th Member of the WTO, 
Vietnam will become more important for trading with European enterprises. 
Past views on wealth-creation of a nation were based on restricted access to 
land, raw materials and capital, but since of globalization these assets can be 
offered respectively with no limits. Today, the scarce resource is knowledge. 
Birkinshaw refers here to the knowledge of the invention of new products and 
services and from patents to process to higher-order capabilities, but most 
important from the skill and experience of individuals (Birkinshaw, 2005:19). 
By looking at the business environment in Singapore several trends become 
apparent: The most important is deregulation and liberalization. Singapore 
and Hong Kong have opened up protected sectors of their economies, such 
as banking, power generation, air travel and telecommunications.  
Additionally, regional giants such as Japan, China and India have also 
carried out liberalization in the manufacturing and service sectors. That 
economically growth from the last two decades of the 1990s will continue in 
the 21st century with a generally slower rate along with economic maturity 
and prosperity (Singh, Delios, 2005:326).  
Low birth rates, namely 9.34 births/1,000 population (2006 est.) and a growth 
rate in Singapore of 0.998% (2009 est.) (CIA Factbook 2009) have to be 
balanced out with attracting new immigrants in order to fight the aging effect 
of the population and to preserve the human capital in the country.  Table 7-3 
shows the fertility rate in Singapore from 2000 until 2010 and points out that it 
is consistently decreasing. Singapore fears that it will shrink into oblivion so 
that the government is forced to promote Singaporeans to have three or 
more children (Washington Post Foreign Service (2004). 
 
 
Table 7-3 Total Fertility Rate in Singapore 2011 
 
Year Total Fertility Rate
2000 1,6 
2005 1,26 
2006 1,28 
 
 
 70
2007 1,29 
2008 1,28 
2009 1,22 
2010 1,15 
 
Source: Own illustration,  
data obtained from Yearbook of Statistics Singapore (2011:27) 
 
Over the medium term, Singapore will face increased low-cost competition 
from regional competitors, particularly China. On the other hand, with the 
entire region recovering relatively well from the 1997-98 financial and 
economic crises, Singapore benefits as a regional hub for trade, investment 
and financial intermediation. 
Over the longer term concerns remain as to whether Singapore’s regimented 
and deferential political and social climate will be conducive to the creation of 
a more vibrant and less risk-averse business environment. On the other 
hand, political and social stability are significant assets, as is the well-
educated and motivated workforce. 
Hence, Singapore’s long-term future as one of East Asia’s most dynamic 
trading economies seems relatively secure (Singapore, 2005:21) but 
Singapore will also recognize the next wave of changes that will incorporate 
government and corporate respect for “new” issues, such as those due to 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate governance, and 
environmental responsibility. Porter (2006:92) is suggesting to move from 
CSR to corporate social integration (CSI), meaning that the moral of doing 
business should be changed and not only to provide damage control to our 
environment. This approach holds promising solutions but the 
implementation will be hard to realize. Nevertheless, in regard to doing 
business in Singapore these considerations should not be off the table when 
western companies intend to enter this market. Further research concerning 
these new strategic factors is strongly suggested, especially during the global 
economical crises.  
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Appendix 9-1 Criminal Offences in Singapore 22 
 
Source: Copyright Infopack, 2006:8  
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Appendix 9-2 Cost of Living Survey 2009  
Rank 
2009 
Rank 
2008 City Country 
Index 
2009 
Index 
2008 
1 2 TOKYO JAPAN 143.7 127 
2 11 OSAKA JAPAN 119.2 110 
3 1 MOSCOW RUSSIA 115.4 142.4 
4 8 GENEVA SWITZERLAND 109.2 115.8 
5 6 HONG KONG HONG KONG 108.7 117.6 
6 9 ZURICH SWITZERLAND 105.2 112.7 
7 7 COPENHAGEN DENMARK 105.0 117.2 
8 22 
NEW YORK 
CITY US 100.0 100.0 
9 20 BEIJING CHINA 99.6 101.9 
10 13 SINGAPORE SINGAPORE 98.0 109.1 
11 10 MILAN ITALY 96.9 111.3 
12 24 SHANGAI CHINA 95.2 98.3 
13 12 PARIS FRANCE 95.1 109.4 
14 4 OSLO NORWAY 94.2 118.3 
15 89 CARACAS VENEZUELA 93.3 79.3 
16 3 LONDON UK 92.7 125 
17 14 TEL AVIV ISRAEL 91.9 105 
18 16 ROME ITALY 91.2 103.9 
19 21 HELSINKI FINLAND 90.5 101.1 
20 52 DUBAI UAE 90.1 89.3 
21 19 VIENNA AUSTRIA 89.3 102.3 
22 61 SHENZHEN CHINA 89.0 86.3 
23 55 LOS ANGELES US 87.6 87.5 
23 70 GUANGZHOU CHINA 87.6 83.9 
25 16 DUBLIN IRELAND 87.4 103.9 
26 65 ABU DHABI UAE 86.7 85.7 
27 34 DOUALA CAMEROUN 86.1 95.1 
28 25 ATHENS GREECE 85.9 97 
29 25 AMSTERDAM NETHERLANDS 85.7 97 
30 45 BRATISLAVA SLOVAKIA 84.8 90.6 
31 89 WHITE PLAINS US 84.7 79.3 
32 30 LAGOS NIGERIA 84.6 95.9 
33 74 TEHRAN IRAN 84.1 82.2 
34 51 ABIDJAN IVORY COAST 82.5 89.6 
34 41 DAKAR SENEGAL 82.5 92.2 
34 78 
SAN 
FRANCISCO US 82.5 81 
37 28 MADRID SPAIN 82.3 96.7 
38 43 LUXEMBOURG LUXEMBOURG 82.1 91.3 
38 31 BARCELONA SPAIN 82.1 95.2 
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40 57 ALGIERS ALGERIA 81.7 86.8 
41 77 HONOLULU US 81.6 81.4 
41 39 BRUSSELS BELGIUM 81.6 92.9 
41 80 BEIRUT LEBANON 81.6 80.8 
44 44 ALMATY KAZAKHSTAN 81.5 90.7 
45 75 MIAMI US 81.4 82 
46 18 
ST 
PETERSBOURG RUSSIA 81.3 103.1 
47 37 MUNICH GERMANY 81.2 93.1 
48 40 FRANKFURT GERMANY 80.9 92.5 
49 38 BERLIN GERMANY 80.8 93 
50 84 CHICAGO US 80.7 80.3 
 
Source:  Mercer, 2009 
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Appendix 9-3 Tax Incentives for Investments in Singapore 1 new 
 
Source: PWC, 2009:26 
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Appendix 9-4 Tax Incentives for Investments in Singapore 2 new 
 
Source: PWC, 2009:27 
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Source: PWC, 2009:28 
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Source: PWC, 2009:29 
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Source: PWC, 2009:30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 XXXIII
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Source: PWC, 2009:31 
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Source: PWC, 2009:32 
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Source: PWC, 2009:33 
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Source: PWC, 2009:35 
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Source: PWC, 2009:36 
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Source: PWC, 2009:54 
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Source: PWC, 2009:56 
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Source: PWC, 2009:56 
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Source: PWC, 2009:57 
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Appendix 9-18 Natural Resources: Overall Rankings 
   
Page 214+ From Adam Smith to Michael Porter   
Main Factor Rankings     
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank 
Russia 74.1 1 Czech Republic 44 27 
Australia 69.1 2 Luxembourg 44 28 
Canada 62.8 3 Thailand 43.2 29 
Iceland 60.3 4 Brazil 42.9 30 
Austria 53.7 5 Hong Kong 42.7 31 
Norway 53.1 6 Portugal 42.1 32 
France 48.6 7 Germany 41.8 33 
United States 48.5 8 Netherlands 41 34 
Spain 47.5 9 Sri Lanka 40.5 35 
Italy 47.5 10 Singapore 40 36 
United Kingdom 47.2 11 Poland 39.4 37 
Mexico 46.5 12 Hungary 39.4 38 
New Zealand 46.3 13 Philippines 39.1 39 
Switzerland 46 14 Greece 39 40 
Indonesia 45.7 15 Taiwan 38.6 41 
Malaysia 45.3 16 Turkey 38.3 42 
Egypt 44.9 17 Pakistan 37.7 43 
Colombia 44.8 18 Guatemala 37.7 44 
Kenia 44.8 19 Bangladesh 37.1 45 
South Africa 44.7 20 Korea 36.7 46 
Sweden 44.6 21 Jordan 35.4 47 
Peru 44.5 22 Romania 35.2 48 
Finland 44.5 23 India 33.8 49 
Denmark 44.3 24 Panama 32.2 50 
Ireland 44.2 25 Japan 30.3 51 
Belgium 44.1 26       
 
Source: Cho, 2000:214 
 
 
 
Appendix 9-19 Natural Resources Intra-Group Rankings 
  
Page 215 From Adam Smith to Michael Porter   
Main Factor Rankings         
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank
OECD (Organization for 
Economic 
 Cooperation and 
Development) Turkey 38.3 1 
Australia 69.1 1 Korea 36.7 2 
Canada 62.8 2 Japan 30.3 3 
Iceland 60.3 3 1st NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) 
Austria 53.7 4 Hong Kong 42.7 1 
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Norway 53.1 5 Singapore 40 2 
France 48.6 6 Taiwan 38.6 3 
United States 48.5 7 2nd NICs    
Spain 47.5 8 Indonesia 45.7 1 
Italy 47.5 9 Malaysia 45.3 2 
United Kingdom 47.2 10 Thailand 43.2 3 
Mexico 46.5 11 Philippines 39.1 4 
New Zealand 46.3 12 
LDCs (Less Developed 
Countries)     
Switzerland 46 13 Russia 74.1 1 
Sweden 44.6 14 Egypt 44.9 2 
Finland 44.5 15 Colombia 44.8 3 
Denmark 44.3 16 Kenia 44.8 4 
Ireland 44.2 17 South Africa 44.7 5 
Belgium 44.1 18 Peru 44.5 6 
Czech Republic 44 19 Brazil 42.9 7 
Luxembourg 44 20 Sri Lanka 40.5 8 
Portugal 42.1 21 Pakistan 37.7 9 
Germany 41.8 22 Guatemala 37.7 10 
Netherlands 41 23 Bangladesh 37.1 11 
Poland 39.4 24 Jordan 35.4 12 
Hungary 39.4 25 Romania 35.2 13 
Greece 39 26 India 33.8 14 
      Panama 32.2 15 
 
Source: Cho, 2000:215 
 
Appendix 9-20 Human Resources: Overall Rankings 
 
 
  
Page 212 From Adam Smith to Michael Porter   
Main Factor Rankings         
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank 
Japan 73.2 1 Ireland 61.4 27 
United States 73 2 Jordan 61.2 28 
Indonesia 72.1 3 Belgium 60 29 
Thailand 70.9 4 United Kingdom 59.7 30 
Singapore 70.7 5 Czech Republic 59.4 31 
Taiwan 69 6 Switzerland 58.8 32 
Korea 67.9 7 Peru 58.4 33 
Hong Kong 67.7 8 Hungary 58.2 34 
Malaysia  66.5 9 Brazil 57.8 35 
Austria 65.7 10 Finland 57 36 
Mexico 65.7 11 Greece 56.5 37 
Iceland 65.6 12 Denmark 56.1 38 
New Zealand 65.6 13 Portugal 56.1 39 
Sri Lanka 65.1 14 Kenia 55.6 40 
Columbia 65 15 Germany 53.8 41 
Netherlands 64.9 16 Romania 52.5 42 
France 64.5 17 Pakistan 52.2 43 
Philippines 64.1 18 Bangladesh 49.4 44 
Luxembourg 64 19 India 46.2 45 
Norway 63.8 20 Australia 45.9 46 
Russia 63.7 21 Italy 45.8 47 
 
 
 XLV
Egypt 63 22 South Africa 42.9 48 
Turkey 63 23 Poland 42.9 49 
Panama 62.8 24 Spain 40.2 50 
Sweden 61.9 25 Guatemala 30.3 51 
Canada  61.7 26       
 
Source: Cho, 2000:212 
 
Appendix 9-21 Human Resources Intra-Group Rankings 
Table 9-7 Human Resources Intra-Group Rankings   
Page 213 From Adam Smith to Michael Porter     
Main Factor Rankings      
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank
OECD (Organization for 
Economic 
 Cooperation and 
Development) Italy 45.8 1 
Japan 73.2 1 Poland 42.9 2 
United States 73 2 Spain 40.2 3 
Korea 67.9 3 1st NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) 
Austria 65.7 4 Singapore 70.7 1 
Mexico 65.7 5 Taiwan 69 2 
Iceland 65.6 6 Hong Kong 67.7 3 
New Zealand 65.6 7 2nd NICs    
Netherlands 64.9 8 Indonesia 72.1 1 
France 64.5 9 Thailand 70.9 2 
Luxembourg 64 10 Malaysia 66.5 3 
Norway 63.8 11 Philippines 64.1 4 
Turkey 63 12 
LDCs (Less Developed 
Countries)     
Sweden 61.9 13 Sri Lanka 65.1 1 
Canada 61.7 14 Colombia 65 2 
Ireland 61.4 15 Russia 63.7 3 
Belgium 60 16 Egypt 63 4 
United Kingdom 59.7 17 Panama 62.8 5 
Czech Republic 59.4 18 Jordan 61.2 6 
Switzerland 58.8 19 Peru 58.4 7 
Hungary 58.2 20 Brazil 57.8 8 
Finland 57 21 Kenia 55.6 9 
Greece 56.5 22 Romania 52.5 10 
Denmark 56.1 23 Pakistan 52.2 11 
Portugal 56.1 24 Bangladesh 49.4 12 
Germany 53.8 25 India 46.2 13 
Australia 45.9 26 South Africa 42.9 14 
      Guatemala 30.3 15 
 
Source: Cho, 2000:213 
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Appendix 9-22 Capital Resources Overall Rankings 
   
Page 216+ From Adam Smith to Michael Porter   
Main Factor Rankings     
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank 
France 97.3 1 Iceland 93.4 27 
Japan 96.9 2 Bangladesh 92.4 28 
Luxembourg 96.4 3 Thailand 92.3 29 
Singapore 96.3 4 Italy 92.2 30 
United Kingdom 96.2 5 Portugal 90.8 31 
Norway 96 6 Philippines 89.3 32 
Denmark 95.8 7 Sri Lanka 88 33 
Netherlands 95.6 8 Egypt 87.8 34 
United States 95.6 9 Indonesia 87.6 35 
Hong Kong 95.4 10 Pakistan 87.4 36 
Belgium 95.3 11 South Africa 87.2 37 
Australia 95.3 12 India 85 38 
Malaysia 95.3 13 Czech Republic 84.1 39 
Switzerland 95.2 14 Greece 82.8 40 
Taiwan 95.2 15 Guatemala 74.4 41 
Panama 95.2 16 Colombia 70.6 42 
Finland 95.2 17 Hungary 70 43 
Canada 95 18 Mexico 66.7 44 
Korea 94.9 19 Kenia 66 45 
Austria 94.9 20 Poland 50.3 46 
Sweden 94.4 21 Peru 39.9 47 
Germany 94.4 22 Romania 15.3 48 
Spain 94.2 23 Turkey 7.9 49 
Ireland 94.1 24 Brazil 0 50 
Jordan 94.1 25 Russia 0 51 
New Zealand 93.9 26       
 
Source: Cho, 2000:216 
 
 
Appendix 9-23 Capital Resource Intra-Group Rankings 
  
Page 217 From Adam Smith to Michael Porter   
Main Factor Rankings         
Country Score Rank Country Score Rank 
OECD (Organization for 
Economic 
 Cooperation and 
Development) Mexico 66.7 1 
France 97.3 1 Poland 50.3 2 
Japan 96.9 2 Turkey 7.9 3 
Luxembourg 96.4 3 1st NICs (Newly Industrialized Countries) 
United Kingdom 96.2 4 Singapore 96.3 1 
Norway 96 5 Hong Kong 95.4 2 
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Denmark 95.8 6 Taiwan 95.2 3 
Netherlands 95.6 7 2nd NICs    
United States 95.6 8 Malaysia 95.3 1 
Belgium 95.3 9 Thailand 92.3 2 
Australia 95.3 10 Philippines 89.3 3 
Switzerland 95.2 11 Indonesia 87.6 4 
Finland 95.2 12 
LDCs (Less Developed 
Countries)     
Canada 95 13 Panama 95.2 1 
Korea 94.9 14 Jordan 94.1 2 
Austria 94.9 15 Bangladesh 92.4 3 
Sweden 94.4 16 Sri Lanka 88 4 
Germany 94.4 17 Egypt 87.8 5 
Spain 94.2 18 Pakistan 87.4 6 
Ireland 94.1 19 South Africa 87.2 7 
New Zealand 93.9 20 India 85 8 
Iceland 93.4 21 Guatemala 74.4 9 
Italy 92.2 22 Colombia 70.6 10 
Portugal 90.8 23 Kenia 66 11 
Czech Republic 84.1 24 Peru 39.9 12 
Greece 82.8 25 Romania 15.3 13 
Hungary 70 26 Brazil 0 14 
      Russia 0 15 
  
Source: Cho, 2000:217 
 
 
 
Appendix 9-24 Development of corporate tax rate in Singapore 
A company is taxed at a flat rate on its chargeable income. The tax rate for 
the respective year of assessment is as follows: 
 
Year of 
Assessment 
(YA) 
Tax 
rate 
Tax exemption / rebate 
2010 
onwards 
17% Partial tax exemption and tax exemption 
scheme for new start-up companies 
Companies will continue to enjoy the partial tax 
exemption scheme and tax exemption scheme for 
new start-up companies as provided in YA 2008 
and YA 2009. 
In addition, with effect from YA 2010, the tax 
exemption scheme for new start-up companies 
will be extended to include companies limited by 
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guarantee, subject to the same conditions. 
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) Rebate and SME 
Cash Grant  
For YA 2011, companies will be granted a 20% 
CIT rebate or a 5% SME cash grant, whichever is 
the higher amount. Click here for more 
information. 
2008 and 
2009 
18% Partial tax exemption for companies 
Effective from YA 2008, a partial tax exemption is 
given to companies on normal chargeable 
income* (excluding Singapore franked dividends) 
of up to $300,000 as follows: 
Exempt amount 
First  $  10,000 @ 75% = $    7,500 
Next  $290,000 @ 50% = $145,000 
Total $300,000      $152,500 
Tax exemption scheme for new start-up 
companies 
Since YA 2005, a qualifying company can claim 
for full tax exemption on the first $100,000 of 
normal chargeable income* (excluding Singapore 
franked dividends) for its first three consecutive 
YA. 
Effective from YA 2008, a further 50% exemption 
is given on the next $200,000 on a qualifying 
company's normal chargeable income* (excluding 
Singapore franked dividends). 
The tax exemption for new start-up companies on 
chargeable income of up to $300,000 is as 
follows: 
Exempt amount 
First  $100,000 @ 100% = $100,000 
Next  $200,000 @  50% = $100,000 
Total $300,000      $200,000 
A company that does not qualify for a tax 
exemption for new start-up companies will be 
given partial tax exemption. 
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2005 to 2007 20% Partial tax exemption for companies 
For YA 2005 to YA 2007, a partial tax exemption 
is given to companies on normal chargeable 
income* (excluding Singapore franked dividends) 
of up to $100,000 as follows: 
Exempt amount 
First  $ 10,000 @ 75% = $  7,500 
Next  $ 90,000 @ 50% = $45,000 
Total $100,000      $52,500 
Tax exemption scheme for new start-up 
companies 
Effective from YA 2005, a qualifying company can 
claim for a full tax exemption on the first $100,000 
of normal chargeable income* (excluding 
Singapore franked dividends) for its first three 
consecutive YA. 
The tax exemption on the $100,000 chargeable 
income is as follows: 
Exempt amount 
First $100,000 @ 100% = $100,000 
A company that does not qualify for tax exemption 
for new start-up companies will be given partial 
tax exemption. 
2003 and 
2004 
22% Partial tax exemption for companies 
For YA 2003 and YA 2004, the tax exempt 
amount is the same as that for YA 2005 to YA 
2007. 
2002 24.5% Partial tax exemption for companies 
Effective from YA 2002, a partial tax exemption is 
given to companies on normal chargeable 
income* (excluding Singapore franked dividends) 
of up to $100,000. The partial tax-exempt amount 
is the same as that for YA 2005 to YA 2007. 
Tax rebate 
For YA 2002, a tax rebate of 5% on the gross tax 
payable (excluding tax on Singapore dividends 
and tax on income subject to final withholding tax) 
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is given. 
2001 25.5% Tax rebate 
For YA 2001, a tax rebate on the gross tax 
payable (excluding tax on Singapore dividends 
and tax on income subject to final withholding tax) 
is given. 
The tax rebate is computed as follows: 
50% on first tax payable of $25,500 
5% on balance of tax payable in excess of 
$25,500 (i.e. gross tax payable less $25,500) 
 
Source: IRAS, 2011 
 
 
 
10 Curriculum Vitae 
 
 
 
 
Persönliche 
Informationen 
 
Geburtsort
Geburtsdatum
Staatsangehörigkeit
 
Saigon/Vietnam 
15.7.1980 
Deutsch 
 
Internationale 
Ausbildung 
10/2006-12/2006
 
Seminar über Private 
Vermögensverwaltung im Gutmann 
Zentrum für Portfolio Management in 
Kooperation mit Bank Gutmann  
8/2005 - 12/2005
 
Betriebswirtschaft an der 
SMU( Singapore Management 
University), Singapur 
 
Seit 10/2001 
 
Internationale Betriebswirtschaft am 
BWZ (BetriebsWirtschaftsZentrum 
der Universität  Wien) Hauptkurse: 
Finanzdienstleistungen, International 
Management, Chinesisch 
 
2000 - 2001
 
Zivildienst beim Malteser-Hilfsdienst 
e.V. Mönchengladbach/ Deutschland 
7/1999 – 8/1999
 
Chien-Tan Sprachinstitut für 
Überseechinesen in Taipei, Taiwan 
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1991 - 2000
 
Math. Nat. Gymnasium, Abitur:2,3 
(Mathematisch 
Naturwissenschaftliches Gymnasium) 
Mönchengladbach/ Deutschland  
 
 
Internationale 
Praxiserfahrungen/ 
Praktika 
Seit 9/2009
 
Produkt Manager im A1 Residential 
Small Business Marketing; 
hauptverantwortlich für A1 MEMBER, 
A1 COMPANY NETWORK, 
Auslandstelefonie 
1/2008 - 8/2009
 
Junior Produkt Manager im Business 
Marketing Voice bei Mobilkom 
Austria; Produkte: A1 MEMBER, 
XTRACARD PRO 
 
7/2007- 12/2007 
 
Top Talent im Business Marketing 
Data bei Mobilkom Austria, Projekte: 
BlackBerry, Windows Mobile, Mobiles 
Internet 
 
30/4/2007-
3/5/2007
 
Teilnahme an der A1 Top Talent 
Competition (Assessment Center) in 
Portoroz/Slowenien organisiert durch 
die Mobilkom Austria 
 
8/2003 – 2/2007
 
Promotor für Mobilkom Austria in 
Wien 
 
8/2003 – 2/2007
 
Freier Dienstnehmer für Sellinnx 
GmbH in Wien, (Projekte: Esprit, 
Nikon) 
 
11/2005
 
AdAsia2005, Ehrenamtlicher 
Mitarbeiter für den 24. Asian 
Advertising Kongress in Singapur 
 
17/6/1996- 
28/6/1996 und 
10/1996 
 
Betriebspraktikum in der Firma C.D. 
(Claude Dufour) Design GmbH in 
Mönchengladbach 
Kreativabteilung:   
Mustervorlagenentwicklung für 
Promotionartikel für Firmen wie  
Mannesmann, Maisel’s Weisse 
Hemdenabteilung: Hemdenmuster für 
die Firma Van Laack 
 
 
Soziales 
Engagement 
1/2008
 
Moderater für das vietnamesische 
Neujahrsfest in Wien 
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2/2004 – 10/2004
 
Moderation des Neujahrsfest 2004, 
2008 in Wien und des 
Buddhistischen Oktoberfestivals  in 
Wien 
 
3/2003-6/2003 
 
Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter für Care 
for Vietnam und Moderator für den 
Vietball 2003 in Wien, 
Wohltätigkeitsveranstaltung zu 
Gunsten behinderter Kinder in 
Vietnam 
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11 Abstract Deutsch: 
 
Durch die Globalisierung wachsen die Regionalen Märkte zu einem 
Weltmarkt und internationale Unternehmen wagen Schritte in neue Gebiete, 
um ihre Produkte weltweit abzusetzen. Die Frage, mit welcher Strategie man 
dieses Neuland betritt und welche Vor- und Nachteile die jeweilige Strategie 
mit sich bringt, soll in dieser Arbeit erörtert werden. Das Zielland ist Singapur, 
ein kleiner Stadtstaat im Südost asiatischem Raum, welches trotz weltweiter 
Wirtschaftskrise viele Möglichkeiten verspricht. Für westliche 
Unternehmungen ist Asien nicht vergleichbar mit Europa. Es existieren 
andere Arbeitsweisen und große kulturelle Unterschiede.  Vor allem gibt es 
den Guanxi Faktor in Ländern, wo Chinesen eine Mehrheit in der 
Bevölkerung darstellen, wie es in Singapur der Fall ist. Guanxi stellt eine 
Lebensphilosophie des „Netzwerkens“ dar, mit der man vieles leichter in 
Asien erreichen kann, um Ziele zu verwirklichen, wenn man die richtige 
Ansprechperson kennt.  Diese Arbeit hilft, das Guanxi Konzept zu verstehen 
und zeigt an dem Praxisbeispiel der Firma TRUMPF (einem deutschen 
Maschinenhersteller), wie diese sich in einer Guanxi Umwelt zurechtfindet 
und mit welcher Eintrittsstrategie sie nach Markt in Singapur erobert haben. 
 
 
 
12 Abstract English: 
 
Due to globalization multinational corporations do not only intend to conduct 
business in their domestic markets but also in the world market. In order to 
do so, the company has to choose the right entry strategy for moving to new 
markets. The thesis is comparing the different entry modes and analyzing the 
pro and cons in the Singaporean context. Singapore as a small city state 
located in South-east Asia, offers an open free market for foreign investors 
and therefore a lot of business opportunities even during the global 
economical crisis. Western companies have to consider cultural differences 
and the existence of the Guanxi factor in Singapore, since Chinese people 
represent the majority of Singapore. With the help of Guanxi, it is possible to 
overcome obstacles by knowing the right person. This thesis elaborates the 
concept of Guanxi and shows how the Germany machine tool company 
Trumpf makes use of Guanxi and explains entry strategy for Singapore 
chosen by the German management. 
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Singapore, Guanxi, Entry Strategy, Trumpf, Wholly Owned Subsidiary 
